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ABSTRACT
Managed care health insurers in the US restrict their enrollees' choice of hospitals to within specific
networks. This paper considers the implications of these restrictions. A three-step econometric model
is used to predict consumer preferences over health plans conditional on the hospitals they offer. The
results indicate that consumers place a positive and significant weight on their expected utility from
the hospital network when choosing plans. A welfare analysis, assuming fixed prices, implies that
restricting consumers' choice of hospitals leads to a loss to society of approximately $1 billion per
year across the 43 US markets considered. This figure may be outweighed by the price reductions
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Managed care health insurers in the US medical care market restrict their enrollees to visiting hospitals
within speci￿c networks. The network o⁄ered by each insurer a⁄ects consumer welfare, hospital pro￿ts
and the incentives faced by hospitals to invest in new capacity, new technology and quality. However,
there is very little literature on the allocation and impact of plans￿hospital networks, constrained
largely by a lack of data on plan contracts. This paper introduces a new dataset that lists the hospital
networks of every managed care plan in 43 markets across the US, making possible an analysis of
the phenomenon. The dataset demonstrates that there is signi￿cant variation across both plans and
markets in the extent to which plans exclude major hospitals from their networks. On average 17%
of potential plan-hospital pairs in my data fail to arrange contracts. The proportion varies from 0%
in some markets to as many as 40% in others. I de￿ne selective markets as those in which at least
four of the ￿ve major plans fail to reach agreement with at least one major hospital: by this de￿nition
roughly 20% of observed markets are selective.
In this paper I investigate the e⁄ects of restricted hospital choice on consumer welfare. This requires
deriving an estimate of consumer demand for health plans conditional on the network of hospitals
they o⁄er. The analysis is conducted in three steps. First I estimate a discrete choice model of
demand for hospitals, taking into account consumer attributes such as location, diagnosis and income.
Identi￿cation comes from the variation in individuals￿hospital choice sets across markets. The second
step is to use the estimated parameters from this demand system to ￿nd each type of consumer￿ s
expected utility from the hospital network o⁄ered by each plan in his or her market. Finally, this
expected utility variable is included as one input to a discrete choice model for health plans. Here
identi￿cation comes from the variation in plan choice sets across markets and from variation in the
quality of the hospitals o⁄ered by each plan both within and across markets.
I use the demand estimates to predict the total welfare generated by the set of health plans in
each market under two scenarios: ￿rst, that plans o⁄er their observed hospital networks, and second,
that all plans contract with every hospital in the market. I ￿nd, assuming ￿xed prices, that a change
from the ￿rst to the second scenario would lead to a median equivalent variation (the dollar spending
needed to compensate consumers for a move back to the observed networks) of $15.70 per privately
insured consumer per year. This translates to a total gain of $1.04 billion for the 43 markets in the
data. The variation across markets is high: there are seven markets in which the equivalent variation
2is over $100 per person per year and thirteen in which it is under $1 per person per year. Producer
surplus e⁄ects are small and negative. The change to unrestricted hospital choice would result in a
median producer surplus reduction of just $19,000 per market per year, translating to a $0.80 million
loss across the markets in the sample. The consumer surplus e⁄ects clearly dominate.
This paper models the demand side of the market only. I predict the change in consumers￿choices
when plans change their hospital networks and use these estimates to generate welfare predictions. I do
not consider the supply side in any detail: the reasons why plans choose to restrict the set of hospitals
they o⁄er, and the bene￿ts that these restrictions might bring, are not modeled in my analysis. Several
potential bene￿ts are clear from the existing health economics literature. First, plans may choose to
limit choice in order to manage supply-side moral hazard problems, denying access to hospitals and
doctors with questionable billing practices1. Second, an awareness of demand-side moral hazard issues,
caused by the existence of generous health insurance and exacerbated by the subsidies implicit in the
tax code, may lead consumers to accept restricted choice, higher deductibles and other coverage limits
in exchange for lower premiums2. Finally, since patients generally stay within insurers￿networks of
hospitals, plans can use the threat of exclusion as a bargaining lever to contain hospital prices3. For all
these reasons, a move to unrestricted hospital networks would be likely to lead to signi￿cant increases
in hospital costs and prices and in health plan premiums. My analysis holds premiums ￿xed. It
therefore estimates just one e⁄ect of selective contracting: the loss to society from restricted hospital
choice, ignoring price e⁄ects. This is a piece of the picture that has not been considered in the previous
literature but it should not be interpreted as de￿ning the full welfare e⁄ect. In fact the bene￿ts of
selective contracting may well outweigh the costs. This is discussed further in the ￿nal section of this
paper4.
I am not the ￿rst to estimate demand for hospitals or for health plans. My analysis is closely
related to the innovative papers of Town and Vistnes (2001) and especially Capps et al (2003). Both
of these papers use logit demand models to estimate consumer preferences over hospitals; these models
are very similar to the ￿rst stage of my analysis5. Capps et al use the demand coe¢ cients to calculate
1See Newhouse (2002) among others for a discussion of these moral hazard problems.
2See, for example, Feldstein (1973) and Pauly (1986).
3Cutler, McClellan and Newhouse (2000) and Capps, Dranove and Satterthwaite (2003) both discuss these issues.
4One further caveat should be noted. The demand analysis yields no information on whether the full-choice outcome
is in fact an equilibrium for pro￿t-maximizing plans.
5Tay (2003), Capps, Dranove, Greenstein and Satterthwaite (2001) and Gaynor and Vogt (2003) also estimate hospital
choice models using encounter-level data and maximum likelihood techniques.
3the value in utils that patients receive from having access to a network of hospitals. The second
stage of my analysis follows this calculation closely. However, my paper di⁄ers from their work in the
method by which utils are translated into dollars for use in policy analysis. Capps et al assume a
simple bargaining model which implies that each hospital receives pro￿ts proportionate to the utility
that it adds to the network; they estimate the dollar value of utils using a simple regression analysis.
I make the more realistic assumption that, if a plan o⁄ers a higher-utility network to consumers, it
will generate higher premiums and pro￿ts. I use the observed relationship between networks and
premiums in the data, together with observed plan market shares, to infer the dollar value of utils.
This requires estimating health plan demand as well as hospital demand but is closer to the ￿rst
principles of consumer demand and therefore more realistic than the approach taken by Capps et al.
The plan choice literature is less fully developed than that on hospital demand. Several papers
consider the e⁄ect of premium changes or quality data on employer and/or consumer choices of health
plans6; most of these use reduced form analysis. I advance this literature by estimating a structural
model of health plan demand that explicitly connects the three key players in this sector of the market
- consumers, plans, and hospitals7. The new dataset mentioned above, collected speci￿cally for this
paper, makes this analysis possible8.
The results reported here have implications for policy. They provide new evidence regarding the
e⁄ect of hospital choice on welfare. Further research is clearly needed both to con￿rm the results of this
paper and to pull together analysis of the demand and supply sides of the market. A complete welfare
analysis would require a full model covering the bargaining process between insurers and hospitals and
the e⁄ect of network changes on prices. I take a ￿rst step towards such a model in Ho (2005)9.
This paper also o⁄ers a framework for analyzing other related demand systems. For example the
6Buchmueller and Feldstein (1997), Beaulieu (2002) and Chernew, Gowrisankaran et al (2004 (a) and (b)) are exam-
ples.
7Previous papers consider just two of the players and make assumptions or use reduced form analysis to bring in
the third. For example, the models in Town and Vistnes (2001) and Capps, Dranove and Satterthwaite (2003) both
include consumers and hospitals explicitly but plans are added only in a reduced form analysis. They ￿nd that hospital
pro￿ts increase with value to the consumer, implying that plan willingness-to-pay increases with this measure. In order
to investigate not prices but the existence of contracts, I model the impact of consumer demand for the hospital on plan
demand explicitly.
8Other important players include primary care physicians, who signi￿cantly impact the consumer￿ s choice of hospital
given his plan, and employers, who select the menu of plans from which the consumer chooses. Data limitations imply
that their contribution cannot be modelled explicitly.
9Ho (2005) employs the results of the demand model estimated in this paper as one input to a model of supply.
First I use the demand estimates, together with data on hospital costs, to predict the producer surplus generated when
each insurer chooses any potential hospital network in its market, holding other plans￿networks ￿xed. Then I use these
predictions, together with data on insurers￿observed choices of hospital networks and on the characteristics of insurers
and providers, to estimate a reduced-form function for the pro￿ts secured by di⁄erent types of hospitals.
4e⁄ect of physician network size, or the number of drugs included in a formulary, on demand for health
plans could be modeled in an analogous way. Similar demand systems also exist in other industries,
where downstream ￿rms such as distributors or retailers contract with networks of upstream ￿rms and
may restrict consumer choice in order to reduce costs or avoid competition. The methods used in this
paper may prove useful in these other situations.
This paper continues as follows. In the next section I describe relevant aspects of the industry and
summarize the variation in networks across plans and markets. The demand estimation is outlined
in Section 3; Section 4 describes the data set; and Section 5 gives details on the estimation strategy.
Demand results are given in Section 6. Section 7 analyzes the welfare e⁄ects of selective contracts and
Section 8 concludes.
2 Industry Background
2.1 Firm and Consumer Decisions
Each year, every privately insured consumer in the US chooses a health plan, generally from a menu
o⁄ered by his employer10, and pays that plan a monthly premium in return for insurance coverage.
The insurer contracts with hospitals and physicians to provide any care needed during the year. When
the consumer requires medical care, he may visit any of the providers listed by the health plan, and
receive services at zero charge or after making a small out-of-pocket payment. There is some variety
in the restrictiveness of di⁄erent types of managed care plan. If an individual is insured by a Health
Maintenance Organization (HMO) he may visit only the hospitals in that plan￿ s network. Point of
Service (POS) plan enrollees can visit out-of-network hospitals but only if referred to them by a
Primary Care Physician. Preferred Provider Organizations (PPOs) and indemnity plans are the least
restrictive insurers: enrollees do not need a PCP referral to visit an out-of-network hospital, although
PPOs may impose ￿nancial penalties for doing so, for example in the form of increased copayments
or deductibles. The focus of this paper is on HMO and POS plans since their network choices have
the strongest e⁄ect on both consumers and hospitals. 53% of the privately-insured population was
enrolled in an HMO/POS plan in 2000.
Throughout the analysis I assume that hospital and plan decisions regarding the type and quality
1058% of the population is insured through an employer, while only 5% purchase insurance independently. (See the
website www. statehealthfacts.k⁄.org).
5of products and services to o⁄er, and also the network of hospitals o⁄ered by each plan, are exogenous
to the consumer￿ s choice of insurer and provider. Two additional assumptions simplify the estimation.
First, I reduce the two-stage process by which employers choose a menu of plans and then consumers
choose a plan from that menu into a single stage representing a "joint" employer/consumer choice.
There is a small literature that investigates how employers make their decisions, and how these deci-
sions relate to consumer preferences11, but since my data does not identify employers I am forced to
ignore this question. Second, I also assume that health plan choices are made at the individual, not the
family, level. I have access only to aggregate plan data; while I could have included the distribution
of family size in my estimation, this would have complicated the model substantially.
2.2 Variation in Size of Hospital Networks
The new dataset introduced in this paper, which lists the hospital network of every HMO and POS
plan in 43 markets across the US, demonstrates signi￿cant variation across both markets and plans
in the extent to which plans exclude major hospitals from their networks. The data were collected
from individual plan websites; missing data were ￿lled in by phone. Figure 1 illustrates the variation.
I categorize markets on a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 is the least selective, indicating that each of
the 5 largest plans (by enrollment) contracts with all 8 largest hospitals (by number of admissions).
In markets ranked 5, at least 4 of the largest plans exclude at least one major hospital; the other
categories lie between these extremes. Markets are fairly evenly spread across the ￿ve categories: 16
markets are ranked 1 or 2 (not selective) and 21 are ranked 4 or 5 (very selective)12. The ￿gure also
shows the distribution of plans by the number of major hospitals excluded, and the variation in this
distribution across types of market. Plans￿selective behavior varies widely: 217 plans exclude no
major hospitals, but 62 plans exclude at least 4 of the 8 major hospitals in their markets. Plans on
average exclude more hospitals in selective markets than elsewhere, but even within markets there is
considerable variation in plan networks. This variation will be an advantage in terms of identi￿cation
when I come to estimate the health plan choice equation. For example, as discussed below, it will be
11See, for example, Chernew, Gowrisankaran et al (2004(a)), which uses a dataset listing the health plans available
to and o⁄ered by employers across markets to examine the e⁄ect of quality information on employers￿choices of health
plans.
12The variation in the extent of selective contracting across markets is not easily explained using market-level variables.
Selective markets do not have signi￿cantly smaller populations, higher managed care penetration, more hospitals or more
beds per capita than unselective markets and are not clustered geographically. There are no signi￿cant di⁄erences in
demographic characteristics such as median income, average age of the population, race or education. These issues are
discussed in further detail in Ho (2005).
6important to include market ￿xed e⁄ects to control for cross-market variation in the quality of the
outside option. I will be able to do this, while still identifying the coe¢ cient on expected utility from
the hospital network, because of the variation in hospital choice sets across plans within each market.
The dataset contains no exclusive contracts (either hospitals reaching agreement exclusively with
a single insurer or vice versa), and very few vertically integrated organizations. Many hospitals and
health plans attempted vertical integration in the 1990s but this has become increasingly rare in recent
years; the literature implies that the breadth of skills needed to run both a hospital and an insurer
is too large for the vertically integrated model to be viable except in very speci￿c circumstances13.
The key exception to this pattern is Kaiser Permanente, a dominant HMO in California and elsewhere
that owns a large number of hospitals but contracts with few outside its own organization. I include
Kaiser health plans and hospitals in the demand estimation and the welfare calculations: they are
important members of the plan and hospital choice sets, particularly in California, and any change in
their hospital networks could have signi￿cant e⁄ects on consumer surplus14.
3 Summary of the Estimation Approach
My main objective in estimating demand is to understand to what extent consumer utility from health
plans is a⁄ected by the set of hospitals o⁄ered by each plan in the market. The analysis requires me
to take three steps: these are summarized in Figure 215. First, I estimate demand for hospitals using
a standard multinomial logit model and allowing for observed di⁄erences across individuals16. With
some probability consumer i becomes ill at time t in market m. His utility from visiting hospital h
given diagnosis l is given by:
uihlt = u(xht;￿h;￿il=￿;￿) (1)
where xht;￿h are vectors of observed and unobserved hospital characteristics respectively, ￿il are
observed characteristics of the consumer such as diagnosis and location, and (￿;￿) are the coe¢ cients
13See, for example, Burns and Pauly (2002) and Burns and Thorpe (2001).
14I repeated the welfare analysis holding Kaiser networks ￿xed as a robustness test. The results are reported in Section
7.
15In principle it would be preferable to estimate the two sets of parameters jointly. Unfortunately this is not possible
due to the scale of the problem: convergence would not be achieved within reasonable time limits.
16This model was ￿rst proposed in McFadden (1973).
7on the speci￿cation17. No outside option is needed in the hospital choice equation: the data includes
only patients who are sick enough to go to hospital for a particular diagnosis18. Consumers choose
hospitals to maximize their utility, so that if consumer i with diagnosis l chooses hospital h then for
all other hospitals h0 in the market:
uihl = u(xh;￿h;￿il=￿;￿) ￿ uih0l = u(xh0;￿h0;￿il=￿;￿) (2)
This maximization produces the set Ah of ￿ that choose hospital h. Thus shares are given by:
sh(x;￿=￿;￿) = Pr(￿￿Ah) (3)
Details of the estimation process are set out in section 5.1. The next step is to take the estimated
parameters ￿;￿ and use them, together with predictions of the probabilities of diagnoses for each
type of consumer, to predict expected utilities provided by each plan￿ s hospital network. The exact
methodology is described in section 5.2. Finally the resulting variable, individual i￿ s expected utility
from the set of hospitals o⁄ered by plan j in market m, which I denote EUijm; is used as an input
to the health plan demand model. In this case I use a methodology similar to that ￿rst proposed by
Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995) (BLP), and later used by Nevo (2000, 2001(a)), Petrin (2001) and
others. The utility of individual i from enrolling in plan j in market m is given by:
wijm = w(zjm;￿jm;premjm;EUijm;yi=#;￿) (4)
where zjm;￿jm are vectors of observed and unobserved plan characteristics respectively, premjm is the
vector of plan premiums (prices charged to consumers), yi is the income of individual i, and (#;￿) are
the coe¢ cients of this speci￿cation. The outside option is choosing to remain uninsured. Exactly the
same reasoning applies as for the hospital demand model, so that if Bjm is the set of consumer types
17Individual i￿ s choice set is de￿ned by his market m; however, no market subscript is needed on individual-speci￿c
variables since individual characteristics i include location. Subscript t is used to de￿ne years. Observed hospital
characteristics were permitted to vary by year; the estimation was simpli￿ed by assuming that unobserved quality and
the estimated coe¢ cients were constant across the two years of available data. The time subscript is omitted for the
remainder of the paper for ease of exposition.
18The consumer￿ s expected utility from the set of hospitals o⁄ered by the plan incorporates the probability of admission
to hospital for each diagnosis, conditional on age and sex, separately from the hospital demand estimates.
8that choose plan j in market m, then plan j￿ s share in market m is:
sjm(z;￿;prem=#;￿) = Pr[(EU;y)￿Bjm] (5)
Details on the empirical approach to estimating this model are given in section 5.3.
Preferences over characteristics in the hospital choice model are identi￿ed using variation in the
individual￿ s hospital choice set across markets. The e⁄ect of each hospital￿ s characteristics is uncovered
by considering the impact of changes in the choice set on hospital market shares: for example, how
does the share of hospital A, which has a high number of nurses per bed, change when hospital B,
with fewer nurses but more doctors per bed, is added to the choice set? (The choice set does not vary
within markets since, as discussed in the next section, I consider indemnity and PPO enrollees only.)
Identi￿cation in the plan choice model comes from variation in the individual￿ s plan choice set across
markets, and also from di⁄erences in plans￿hospital networks, both within and across markets. This
allows me to estimated the impact of the key variable, the individual￿ s expected utility from the plan￿ s
hospital network, on his plan preferences.
4 Data
My analysis employs three sets of data. The ￿rst, which covers 11 US markets, includes all the
information needed to estimate the consumer utility equation for hospitals. The second identi￿es the
hospitals in the network of every managed care plan in a di⁄erent sample of 43 US markets; this is
used to predict the utility each individual can expect to gain from the hospital network o⁄ered by
each plan in his or her market. The third dataset contains other plan characteristics and plan market
shares for the same 43 markets; this is the ￿nal input needed to estimate the consumer utility equation
for health plans.
4.1 Hospital Dataset
The core of this dataset is the MEDSTAT MarketScan Research Database for 1997-98. It is constructed
from privately insured paid medical claims data provided by approximately 50 employer databases
across the US and gives encounter-level data on all hospital admissions of the relevant enrollees during
this two-year period. For each admission, the data includes the patient diagnosis and characteristics,
9the identity of the hospital and the type of plan. Patient income is not included in the MEDSTAT
data; I approximate this using the median income of families in the Zip Code Tabulation Area (ZCTA),
taken from Census 2000 data. This very detailed dataset enables me to pin down quite accurately the
e⁄ect of individual patient characteristics on their choice of hospitals.
My ￿nal analysis will investigate consumers￿choice of managed care plans. Thus in an ideal world
I would estimate consumers￿hospital choices using data for managed care enrollees and identifying
preferences using each individual￿ s choice of hospital given the choice set speci￿ed by his or her plan.
However, this is not feasible because the MEDSTAT data does not identify the hospital networks o⁄ered
by each managed care plan: that is, the hospital choice set of managed care enrollees is unobserved.
Instead I examine the choices made by indemnity and PPO enrollees, whose hospital choice sets
are unrestricted. Two signi￿cant assumptions are required to apply the equation estimated here as
an input to the plan choice equation estimated later. The ￿rst is that indemnity plan/PPO enrollees
have the same preferences over hospitals as HMO/POS enrollees conditional on their diagnosis, income
and location. This assumption has been made several times in the existing literature and may not
be unreasonable19. The average fee-for-service plan enrollee probably has di⁄erent preferences over
hospitals from the average managed care enrollee before he knows his diagnosis: for example, he may
have a stronger desire for choice. However, when informed that he has a speci￿c disease, he might
well choose the same hospital as the average managed care enrollee of the same age and living in the
same zip code20.
The second assumption regards prices. PPO enrollees may be required to pay additional copays
or deductibles if they choose to go out-of-network. These ￿nancial penalties, and the hospitals in the
PPO network, are not identi￿ed in the dataset; that is, the ￿price￿of the hospital at the point of
service is unobserved. I therefore assume that out of pocket prices charged to patients on the margin
are zero for both PPO and indemnity patients. This may be reasonable, particularly where prices
19For example, Town and Vistnes (2001) use data on the hospital selection decisions of Medicare enrollees, assuming
that the Medicare population￿ s valuation of hospitals is a reasonable proxy for that of HMO enrollees. Capps, Dranove
and Satterthwaite (2003) make a similar assumption to justify considering patients insured by Medicare, Medicaid, Blue
Cross/Blue Shield and indemnity plans.
20I test this assumption by estimating the hospital choice model separately using MEDSTAT data for HMO/POS
enrollees in Boston MA, a market in which I observe that the vast majority of plans contract with all hospitals. (I
observe this fact for 2003; I assume it also to have been true in 1997/8.) The estimated coe¢ cients are not identical,
but are broadly similar, to those estimated using PPO/indemnity enrollee data for Boston MA only. Where HMO/POS
enrollees derive positive (negative) utility from a hospital or characteristic, PPO/indemnity enrollees do the same, often
with similar coe¢ cient magnitudes. Only 3 out of 36 hospital dummy coe¢ cients and 2 out of 32 interaction coe¢ cients
are di⁄erent in sign across the two models and both signi￿cant at p=0.1. While not overwhelming evidence, I take this
to be su¢ cient to support the assumption, particularly given that no other approach is possible with the available data.
10take the form of increased deductibles, since many of these patients are likely to have spent past their
deductible before making their decision21;22.
Further details on the hospital data, and the other datasets used for the demand estimation, are
given in Appendix A. Tables 1 and 2 set out summary statistics for the hospital dataset. I consider
the 11 largest markets in the MEDSTAT data (those with over 1000 observations per market-year):
the dataset therefore includes 217 hospitals, 434 hospital-years and 28,666 encounters in total. The
hospitals have 286 beds and 1.24 registered nurses per bed on average; 20% are teaching hospitals. 51%
of patients are enrolled in a PPO rather than an indemnity plan; 63% are women. The most common
diagnoses are labor (17% of encounters) and cardiac admissions (11%). The employers providing data
are not identi￿ed; however, the most common industry sectors are services (including hotels, personal
services and health care; these comprise 46% of observations) and durable good manufacturing (31% of
observations). Other industry sectors represented include non-durable good manufacturing, transport,
communications and utilities, and state and local government.
4.2 Plan Networks
The link between the hospitals and the HMO/POS plans in each market is provided by a uniquely
constructed dataset that de￿nes, for every HMO/POS plan in the 43 markets covered by the plan
characteristics data, the network of hospitals o⁄ered to enrollees in March/April 200323. The dataset
includes 516 HMO/POS plans and 665 hospitals in total (on average 12 plans and 15 hospitals in each
market). The data are summarized in section 2.2 above.
21The average copay for PPO enrollees in my data was $289 for an average stay of 4.8 days. At only around 3% of the
average cost per admission, this is probably small enough to justify the zero-price assumption. I tested the assumption
further by re-estimating the hospital choice model using data for indemnity enrollees only (roughly half the total sample).
The results were similar to those for the main speci￿cation. No interaction coe¢ cients had di⁄erent signs in the two
models and were both signi￿cant at p=0.10. Not surprisingly, the standard errors were higher in the robustness test.
22Three further assumptions are also implicit in the methodology. First, I assume that managed care enrollees have
the same probability of admission to hospital conditional on age and gender as the overall population. Second, patients
choosing managed care plans are assumed to place as high a value on their health as those choosing indemnity plans.
Finally, I assume that employees in the MEDSTAT dataset are representative of all privately-insured consumers in the
market, conditional on age and gender.
23I consider all the markets covered by the Atlantic Information Services data described in Section 4.3 except New
York. The markets are listed in Appendix A. I assume that enrollees in POS plans, like those in HMOs, are restricted to
hospitals within their insurer￿ s network.
114.3 Plan Characteristics
The ￿nal dataset contains aggregate data on health plan characteristics, including plan enrollment, for
the 516 HMO/POS plans covered by the plan networks dataset. Each potential plan choice is de￿ned
as an insurer - product (HMO/POS) ￿market. Thus Aetna HMO is a separate choice from Aetna POS
plan in Boston. Data are brought together from several sources. Atlantic Information Services provide
data on enrollment and characteristics (premiums earned, number of enrollees, tax status and other
information) for the 3rd and 4th Quarters of 2002 respectively. The Weiss Ratings￿Guide to HMOs
and Health Insurers includes additional plan characteristics for over 500 HMOs in Fall 2002. Finally,
data on plan performance are taken from the Health Employer Data and Information Set (HEDIS)
and the Consumer Assessment of Health Plans (CAHPS) 2000 data, both of which are published by
the National Committee for Quality Assurance (NCQA). These data measure clinical performance
and patient satisfaction in 1999, and are taken from the ￿rst year in which NCQA required plans to
hire third-party ￿rms to audit the data24.
Variable de￿nitions and summary statistics for the plan dataset are given in Table 5. The average
market share of the HMO/POS plans in the dataset is 3%25. Premiums average $141 per member per
month. 35% of insurers are POS plans; 76% have been in existence for over 10 years. HEDIS scores
vary widely, from an average rating of 0.15 (for the percent of children receiving all required doses of
MMR, Hepatitis B and VZV vaccines before their 13th birthday) to an average of 0.73 (the proportion
of women aged 52-69 who had received a mammogram within the previous two years). The two most
frequently-occurring plans are Aetna and CIGNA, with 15% and 10% of observations respectively.
Several assumptions are needed to link the datasets. In order to apply the estimated parameters
from the 11 markets in the hospital dataset to the 43 markets used for the plan choice model I assume
that hospital preferences given demographics and diagnosis are ￿xed across markets and over time26.
In addition, because patient diagnosis and severity of illness in￿ uence hospital choice but are not
24Individuals choosing health plans in 2002 would in fact have been informed by NCQA 2001 data, to which I do not
have access. I therefore choose the HEDIS and CAHPS 2000 variables that are most highly correlated with their 1999
counterparts, assuming that their correlation with the 2001 data will also be high. All variables used have correlations
with the 1999 data of over 0.65.
25Shares are measured as percent of the nonelderly population in the market. See Appendix A for details of the
methodology used to generate this variable and robustness tests of the resulting data.
26A comparison of the two sets of markets shows no signi￿cant di⁄erence in population, managed care penetration or
demographic characteristics such as age, education, race or income. The characteristics of the hospitals in the two sets
of markets are also similar except that the per cent of for-pro￿t hospitals in the market is higher, in a test of size 0.05,
in the 43 markets used for the plan choice model. I control for this di⁄erence by including hospital ownership details in
the hospital demand model and the expected utility calculation.
12observed in the health plan data, I assume invariance of both factors across markets and over time.
I then predict diagnosis probabilities in di⁄erent markets based on age and sex and assume that the
predicted choices from an equation that excludes severity can be interpreted as average choices across
the severity distribution27.
5 Demand: Details on Empirical Approach
5.1 Demand for Hospitals
The speci￿cation of the utility function giving rise to PPO/indemnity enrollees￿demand for hospitals
is given by:
uihl = ￿h + xh￿il￿ + "ihl (6)
where "ihl captures unobserved idiosyncratic tastes which are assumed to be iid distributed according
to a Type 1 extreme value distribution. The hospital-speci￿c variable ￿h is given by:
￿h = ￿h + xh￿ (7)
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(8)
where Nil is the number of individuals in consumer-type i who are hospitalized with diagnosis l, N
is the number of individuals admitted to hospital in the market, and H is the set of hospitals in the
market.
To ensure consistency of the coe¢ cient estimates, I include hospital ￿xed e⁄ects in my estimation of
equation (8): these give me the predicted ^ ￿
0
s28. Since all the variables in equation (8) are observed, the
27Linking the various sources of plan data also requires an assumption: since the network dataset was compiled after
the AIS enrollment data, I assume that plans￿hospital networks were stable between 2001, when individuals choosing
plans for Q4 2002 made their decisions, and Q1-2 2003 when the network data were observed. It is reassuring to note
that I gathered 25% of the plan network data twice: ￿rst in Q4 2002 and second in Q2 2003. There was very little change
in networks between these two dates.
28The alternative would be to include uninteracted hospital characteristics (the x￿ s) in the speci￿cation: that is, to
estimate ￿ directly. However, this would imply ignoring unobserved quality ￿; the estimates of ￿ and ￿ would therefore
13estimation can be performed using MLE. A number of interaction terms are also included. Previous
studies have shown that distance travelled to hospital has a signi￿cant negative e⁄ect on utility: the
distance between hospital and patient residence zipcodes, distance squared, and distance interacted
with market dummies and a dummy indicating an emergency admission are included to account
for this. The other interactions are between patient characteristics (the seven diagnosis categories
listed in Appendix A, income, a dummy for emergency admissions and a PPO dummy) and hospital
characteristics (teaching status; tax status; the number of nurses per bed and four variables that
summarize the services o⁄ered by each hospital)29. Interactions that should have no e⁄ect (for example,
a cancer diagnosis interacted with provision of birth services) are restricted to be zero.
Since the next step is to use the estimated coe¢ cients in markets and years outside my sample, I
need to predict the value of ^ ￿ using variables included in the plan dataset. Assuming that ￿h is the
sampling error in ￿h, ^ ￿h = ￿h + ￿h, I estimate the following equation:
^ ￿h = xh￿ + ￿h + ￿h (9)
where ￿h is unobserved hospital quality as de￿ned above. I estimate equation (9) by regressing the
estimated hospital dummy coe¢ cients on 31 hospital characteristic variables taken from the AHA
1997 and 1998 data. Market ￿xed e⁄ects are also included30. To account for the heteroscedasticity
introduced by ￿, I adjust the standard errors of the OLS regression using White￿ s (1980) heteroscedastic
consistent standard error estimator31.
be inconsistent. I tried this alternative approach as a robustness test: the estimates of ￿ changed only a little, but the ^ ￿
were signi￿cantly di⁄erent, often a factor of 10 smaller than the main speci￿cation.
29The hospital service variables are described in detail in Appendix A. Market and time ￿xed e⁄ects cannot be included
since there is no outside option in the hospital choice equation. Removing emergency admissions from the dataset had
little e⁄ect on the results. I also removed newborn babies: this had no a⁄ect on the estimated coe¢ cients up to the
second decimal place.
30The variables included are: number of beds; distance from City Hall; distance from City Hall squared; registered
nurses per bed and nurses per bed squared; doctors per bed; dummy variables for JCAHO accreditation, cancer program
approved by ACS, residency training program, medical school, member of Council of Teaching Hospitals of the Asso-
ciation of American Medical Colleges, Independent Practice Association, Foundation, Indemnity Fee for Service Plan,
osteopathic hospital, and operating subsidiary corporations; Control/ownership dummies (control by county, Church and
For-pro￿t partnership); and a list of service dummies (for neonatal intensive care, angioplasty, cardiac catheterization
laboratory, computed-tomography scanner, positron emission tomography, single photon emission computerized tomog-
raphy, oncology services, obstetric services, emergency department, breast cancer screening, burn care, and alcohol/drug
abuse inpatient care). Market ￿xed e⁄ects are needed to normalize the baseline hospitals - that is, the randomly-chosen
hospitals, one in each market, whose dummies are excluded from the choice model - across markets. The ￿xed e⁄ects
are set to zero when the analysis is extended out of sample. I repeated the analysis without the market ￿xed e⁄ects as
a robustness test: the ￿nal results were very similar to those from the main speci￿cation.
31White￿ s estimator does not adjust for serial correlation. However, the o⁄-diagonal elements of E(￿￿
0), the variance-
covariance matrix for ^ ￿, are of order one hundredth the magnitude of the diagonal elements. I assume that E(￿￿
0) =
￿
2I; so by assumption there is no serial correlation in ￿. It therefore seems reasonable to assume no serial correlation in
14The estimated coe¢ cients (the ￿￿ s in equation (9)) are used to predict the ^ ￿
0
s in equation (8) when
the analysis is extended out-of-sample. The speci￿cation for predicted utility used in the subsequent
analysis is therefore given by the following:
^ uihl = ￿h + xh^ ￿ + xh￿il^ ￿ + "ihl (10)
where ^ ￿ and ^ ￿ are estimated in the two-stage process describe above, " is assumed to be distributed
iid according to the Type 1 extreme value distribution, and ￿ is unobserved hospital quality.
5.2 Expected Utility from each Plan￿ s Hospital Network
5.2.1 Computing the Expected Utility Variable
The analysis now moves from the hospital dataset to the plan data, taking the estimated coe¢ cients
from equations (8) and (9) and using them to predict the utility that each type of individual expects
to receive from the hospital network of each HMO/POS plan in his market32. Individual i￿ s expected







where pil is the probability that individual i will be hospitalized with diagnosis l and Hjm is the set
of hospitals o⁄ered by HMO/POS plan j in market m33;34. Ben-Akiva (1973) shows that, under the







exp(￿h + xh^ ￿ + xh￿il^ ￿)g (12)
￿ + ￿.
32This is the point in the analysis when I begin to use the dataset listing the hospital network of each HMO/POS plan
in 43 US markets. Up until now I have considered only indemnity/PPO enrollees in the 11 markets considered from the
MEDSTAT dataset, who I assume have access to all hospitals in the market. I now switch to HMO/POS enrollees whose
choice is limited.
33The expectation over values of " implies an assumption that each individual￿ s " is unknown when he chooses his plan.
The alternative assumption, that he knows his " when making the choice, leads to a di⁄erent expression for expected
utility: EUijm =
P
l pil(max(^ uihl)): I estimate this quantity as a robustness check by by taking draws of " from the Type
1 extreme value distribution, and assigning a draw to each simulated individual in each ZCTA-age-sex cell, for every
possible diagnosis. Using this new expected utility variable in the health plan choice model had little e⁄ect on the ￿nal
results.
34The expected utility variable is the equivalent of the expectation over the probabilities of di⁄erent diagnoses of Capps
et al￿ s (2005) V
IU(G;Yi;Zi;￿i). My methodology therefore incorporates the "option demand" calculations in that paper.
15Six diagnoses (l) are included here: all the categories described in Appendix B except newborn babies35.
5.2.2 Methodologies to Account for Unobserved Hospital Quality ￿
The rest of the methodology would be straightforward if ￿ was known; unfortunately I do not observe
this variable directly. However, some analysis of the magnitude of ￿ is possible using the available
data. If we take draws ￿* from the distribution of ￿ and assign one draw as each hospital￿ s unobserved
quality (measured with error), then the error in the resulting expected utility variable EU
￿￿
ijm (the



















where Chl = exp(xh^ ￿+xh￿il^ ￿). This implies that the expected value of the error is zero, since ￿ and ￿*
are iid draws from the same distribution. In a linear context, such as the logit demand framework used
as a benchmark model below, we can therefore adjust for the measurement error using an instrument
correlated with EU
￿￿
ijm but not with the error in measuring this variable. I use EU
no ￿
ijm , the predicted
expected utility from the plan￿ s hospital network found using the methodology above but ignoring
￿, as an instrument for EU
￿￿
ijm
36. I use information on the distribution of ￿ + ￿ (the residuals from
estimation of equation (9)) and assume that ￿ = 0 when creating EU
￿￿
ijm; the test therefore provides an
upper bound for the impact of ￿ on the model￿ s predictions37. The results are encouraging: the test￿ s
logit model predictions are very similar to those for the main model, implying that the assumption
that ￿ = 0 does not lead to signi￿cant bias. For this reason I assume ￿ = 0 in the main analysis.
I conduct one robustness test for this assumption. I use a methodology ￿rst introduced by Hanushek
(1974) and developed by Lewis (2000) to estimate the variance of ￿. The idea is to use OLS regression
to estimate the variance of ￿+￿, and then use the estimate of E(￿￿0) obtained in the ￿rst stage choice
35Newborn infants are included in the hospital choice model but not the expected utility calculation. Inclusion in the
hospital model implies that the baby is considered by the hospital to be a separate unit from its mother. In contrast,
I assume that the health plan does not consider the baby as a separate entity, whose preferences should be considered
separately from those of its mother, until after the birth episode. (The mother considers her preferences regarding the
hospital in which to give birth when she chooses her health plan; she does not choose a plan for her baby until after its
birth.) As noted in section 5.1, removing newborn infants from the hospital choice model had very little e⁄ect on the
results.
36The expected utility variable used in the logit framework, which as describe below is e⁄ectively an average over
individuals within the most populated ZCTA in the market, also has the property that E(error/x, ￿) = 0, implying that
the instrumental variables methodology is valid.
37Assuming that ￿ and ￿ are not negatively correlated.
16model to back out a variance estimate for ￿. Details are given in Appendix B. I ￿nd that the variance
of ￿ is negligible compared to that of ￿, implying that only a very small proportion of the "lack of ￿t"
in estimating equation (9) is due to unobserved hospital quality. Unfortunately this test is not very
powerful in this application. For example, when I remove the number of nurses per bed (a plausible
measure of hospital quality) from the speci￿cation the variance of ￿ is still reported to be negligible.
Even with this caveat, however, the combined results of this section are su¢ cient to justify setting
￿ = 0 for the main analysis.
5.2.3 Creating the Expected Utility Variable: Other Issues
The coe¢ cients on market-distance interactions, emergency-distance interactions, and interactions
with PPO dummies and newborn infant dummies in the hospital utility equation are assumed to be
zero in the expected utility calculation38. I assume that patients in POS plans, like those in HMOs, are
restricted to hospitals within their insurer￿ s network (that is, I ignore the possibility that their PCP
might refer them to an out-of network hospital). I have no choice about making this assumption: my
plan data is at the aggregate level so I have no way to observe which hospitals enrollees in particular
POS plans actually visit. The expected utility of consumers choosing indemnity plans or no insurance
are also needed. Consumers with indemnity plans can in general go to any hospital in the market and
their expected utility is predicted accordingly39. I assume that uninsured consumers expect to gain
zero utility from hospitals40.
5.3 Demand for Health Plans Conditional on the Hospital Network O⁄ered
The ￿nal step is to take the predicted expected utility from the hospital network of each plan, for each
type of individual, and include it as an input to the plan demand equation. I begin with a simple logit
model, ignoring the distribution of individual characteristics within markets, before moving on to a
fuller model where variation in individual attributes is taken into account.
38I assume that consumers do not consider the hospital they would choose in an emergency when choosing a health
plan. My assumption that preferences over hospital characteristics, given diagnosis and demographics, are ￿xed across
markets implies no need to include market-distance interactions: I assume the coe¢ cient on distance is that estimated
for Boston, my "base case" market.
39Hospitals can choose not to contract with an indemnity of PPO plan if the plan￿ s reimbursement rates are too low.
I may therefore be over-stating the number of hospitals from which these consumers can choose.
40This is not quite right: uninsured consumers can be admitted to public hospitals as emergency cases. The implications
of this are discussed later in the paper.
175.3.1 The Benchmark Model: Logit Formulation
The logit framework assumes common coe¢ cients for all individuals. It has the advantage of generating
an equation that is easy to estimate, making it a useful benchmark model. However, estimating such
a model requires a plan-level, rather than plan-individual-level variable representing expected utility
from the hospital network. I therefore de￿ne a representative agent in each market as an individual
living in the most populated ZCTA and having the weighted average probability of diagnoses and of
hospital admission of people resident in that ZCTA. I de￿ne the plan-level expected utility as that of









exp(￿h + xh^ ￿ + xh￿
rep
l ^ ￿)g (14)
where p
rep
l is the weighted average probability of diagnoses of individuals in the most populated ZCTA,
and ￿
rep
l is the vector of other characteristics of an individual in that ZCTA (income and location, the
only individual characteristics other than diagnosis that are not set to zero, are both de￿ned at the
ZCTA level). I control for the unobserved ￿ ￿rst by assuming ￿ = 0 and then by using the instrumental
variables methodology already described. The utility of consumer i from choosing plan j in market m
is therefore given by:
wijm = ￿jm + zjm# + ￿1EUrepjm + !ijm (15)
where premium is included in the observed plan characteristics z, and I assume that the !ijm is
distributed iid according to a Type 1 extreme value distribution41. Normalizing the utility of all
consumers from the outside good (good 0) to be zero, I obtain the standard equation for estimation:
log(sjm) ￿ log(s0m) = ￿jm + zjm# + ￿1EUrepjm (16)
where s0m is the share of the outside good in market m.
41Both the logit and the full demand speci￿cations assume that consumer utility from the hospital network (which is
a function of the probabilities of di⁄erent possible diagnoses) is additively separable from other aspects of plan quality
in the plan demand equation. In terms of a utility equation where expected health is the key input, this implies that
the individual￿ s expectation of the e⁄ect of a hospital on his health depends on his diagnosis, but his expectation of the
e⁄ect of the plan is independent of diagnosis. This makes sense given that many plan functions are preventive whereas
most if not all hospital interventions are speci￿c to a diagnosis.
18The logit model can be estimated using a simple two stage least squares methodology (instrument-
ing for premiums since these are likely to be correlated with the unobserved quality variable ￿). The
basic plan characteristics included in z are: premium per member per month42, number of physicians
per 1000 population in the market and age of the plan (coded into four dummies: less than 3 years, 3-5
years, 6-9 years and over 10 years of age). The HEDIS measures used are the breast cancer and cervical
cancer screening rates; the rate of check-ups after live deliveries; the proportion of diabetic patients
with annual eye exams; the proportion of adolescents receiving ￿nal immunizations before their 13th
birthday; the proportion of smokers advised by their physician to quit; and the proportion of patients
seen on an outpatient basis within 30 days of discharge from a mental illness admission. The CAHPS
measures are "getting needed care" and "getting care quickly". Each is an aggregation of responses
to several CAHPS questions. The CAHPS measures of plan performance are highly correlated with
one another; so are the HEDIS measures. Missing variable dummies are included in all speci￿cations.
Insurer ￿xed e⁄ects are included for insurers that are active in at least 10 of the major markets de￿ned
by AIS43, and market dummies are also included in some speci￿cations.
The model is completed by de￿ning the outside good. The simplest de￿nition to implement would
be a composite of non-managed care private coverage and uninsured (I exclude Medicare by considering
only the non-elderly population, and exclude Medicaid by assumption; see Appendix A for details).
However, indemnity coverage and no coverage are at opposite ends of the spectrum in terms of price
and many aspects of quality so this outside good would be non-homogeneous. Instead I de￿ne the
outside good as "choosing to be uninsured" and create a separate choice in each market, de￿ned as
"choosing indemnity or PPO insurance", and assumed to be homogeneous within each market44. None
of the data sources provides information on non-managed care coverage, so assumptions must be made
to complete the dataset. Indemnity plans are assumed to be over ten years old; to have premiums
equal to the highest managed care premium in the relevant market; and to o⁄er a physician network
42Premium is de￿ned as average plan revenue per enrollee (including both employer and employee contributions). The
measure is therefore somewhat noisy: this may lead to attenuation bias in the estimated premium coe¢ cient. I would
ideally adjust this variable for the severity of illness of the average enrollee. However, a regression of premiums on
observed plan characteristics had an R
2 of just 0.34, implying that the adjustment would add too much additional noise
to be helpful.
43These are Aetna, CIGNA, Coventry, Health Net, Kaiser Permanente, One Health, Paci￿Care, United, UNICARE
and Blue Cross Blue Shield plans.
44Assuming homogeneity of this option, and making the assumptions needed to de￿ne its characteristics, are problem-
atic. The quality of this option will a⁄ect consumer choices of HMO and POS plans. Data limitations prevent me from
modelling this option more completely; instead I include market ￿xed e⁄ects in the demand speci￿cation to account for
cross-market di⁄erences in both this and the outside option.
19size equal to the largest o⁄ered by a managed care plan in the market. Indemnity plan performance
ratings (both HEDIS and CAHPS) are assumed to equal the average of managed care plans in the
market45. Average quality for uninsured consumers is not identi￿ed in the plan choice model (unless
I make more assumptions or normalize one of the "inside" goods) so I normalize it to zero.
The instruments used for the premium variable, in addition to the usual set of plan characteristics
(the z0s), are the average hourly hospital wage and the average weekly nurse wage across the markets
in which each health plan is observed to be active. Hospital wage data comes from the Centers for
Medicaid and Medicare Services (CMS) 1999; nurse wage data is from the Bureau of Labor Statistics
1999. The assumption required for these to be valid instruments is that health plan costs are correlated
with premiums but not with unobserved health plan quality. The choice of instruments is a di¢ cult
issue. I use average wages across the plan￿ s markets, rather than same-market wages, to generate
variation across plans within each market. However, this requires an additional assumption that plans
set their premiums partly centrally, in response to cost changes across all markets served, which may
not be realistic46;47.
The last issue is the need to adjust the estimated standard errors for the three-step estimation
process being used here48. I need to take into account the fact that the expected utility variable is
constructed from estimated parameters. This has no impact on the consistency of the results but,
since the estimator is not adaptive, will a⁄ect the standard error estimates.
To incorporate the e⁄ect of these estimated parameters into the estimates of the variance-covariance
matrix, I take advantage of the GMM structure of the estimation procedure. Incorporating estimated
parameters into a GMM estimator is fairly straightforward. An extension of Pakes (1997) shows that
if there exist ￿rst stage parameter estimates ￿ such that
45An alternative would be to assume that indemnity plan ratings = 0 for all HEDIS and CAHPS measures. I repeated
the analyses under this assumption with little change in results.
46If the instruments were in fact correlated with unobserved quality this would imply an upward bias on the premium
coe¢ cient, making it less negative than the true value. This would add to the problems caused by attenuation bias in
the premium coe¢ cient.
47I do not instrument for the expected utility variable. This implies an assumption that plans￿hospital networks are
not correlated with unobserved plan characteristics such as the generosity of prescription drug coverage. I control for this
issue in part by including large plan ￿xed e⁄ects. The fact that the correlation between expected utility and observed
plan attributes is small - less than 0.09 for cancer screening, physician network size and the CAHPS variables - is also
reassuring.
48The ￿rst step is the estimation of the hospital choice model including hospital ￿xed e⁄ects; the second is the regression
of the ￿xed e⁄ect coe¢ cients on hospital characteristics; the third is estimation of the health plan choice model including
the expected utility variable.
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and second stage parameter estimates ￿ such that
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then, under standard regularity conditions, the third stage parameter estimates ￿n are distributed
asymptotically normal as
p
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where ￿ is the derivative of the moment condition with respect to the parameters, A is the weight
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2) + 6 covariance terms
where gjm are the third-stage moments, M1 is a matrix of derivatives of g(z;x;￿;￿0;￿0;￿0) with
respect to the elements of ￿0 , M2 is a matrix of derivatives of g(z;x;￿;￿0;￿0;￿0) with respect to
the elements of ￿0;and vc1and vc2 are the variance-covariance matrices from the ￿rst two stages. The
covariance terms can be reduced to an expression depending solely on the expectations of products of
M1;M2;L1;L2; and the individual moment conditions. Further details of the methodology used are
given in Appendix C.
5.3.2 Full Demand Speci￿cation
Since the focus of the analysis is on the weight consumers attach to the expected utility variable in
the plan demand equation, the obvious extension to the logit model is to allow a richer speci￿cation
of this expected utility term. The full demand speci￿cation includes the full variable EUijm rather
than the summary measure used in the logit formulation and therefore accounts for the impact of
the distribution of individual locations, income and demographics within each market on plan market
shares. This has the additional advantage of avoiding the logit model￿ s well-known unattractive
21implication: the imposition of the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) substitution pattern
for an individual patient￿ s choice of plan. The IIA assumption implies that cross-price e⁄ects are a
function solely of plan shares and are independent of plans￿relative positions in the characteristic
space. This is clearly inaccurate to the extent that consumers substitute more readily between plans
that are ￿ closer￿in terms of characteristics (for example a consumer switching from a high-premium,
high-choice plan is more likely to choose another high-premium plan with similar qualities than a
low-premium competitor that o⁄ers restricted choice of providers).
The utility of consumer i choosing plan j in market m in the full demand speci￿cation is given by:




where premjm is plan j￿ s premium in market m, yi is the median family income of individual-type
i (de￿ned by ZCTA), and the other variables are as speci￿ed above. This is similar to the model
introduced in BLP (1995) in which random coe¢ cients, which are functions of demographic variables
taken from market-level census data, are interacted with product characteristics. The di⁄erence is that,
in this equation, both consumer-speci￿c terms (EUijm and yi) are observed, either at the ZCTA level
(in the case of income) or at the ZCTA-age-gender level (for the expected utility variable). Therefore









where ni is the number of individuals in consumer-type i, nm is the number in the market, and
sijm(#;￿); the share of type - i individuals choosing plan j in market m, is de￿ned by:
sijm(#;￿) =









The presence of the unobserved quality measure ￿ implies that MLE cannot be used to estimate the
model (as it was for the plan demand equation)50. Instead, the contraction mapping introduced in
49The ZCTA-level income measure, and consumer cell-level expected utility measure, are themselves assumed to be
integrals over the types of people within the cell. The methodology used here therefore e⁄ectively integrates out over
individuals, as in BLP.
50If plan ￿xed e⁄ects were included they would subsume the unobservable ￿ and MLE could be used. However, the
dataset is too small to successfully estimate all 516 plan dummy coe¢ cients in addition to the other parameters.
22BLP (1995) is used to transform equation (22) into a linear equation for ￿ and the coe¢ cients estimated
using a GMM methodology, again as in BLP (1995)51. The variables included in z are the same as
those used in the logit speci￿cation. I instrument for premium for the same reasons as in the logit
framework; I add two instruments to the hospital and nurse wage variables used before. These are the
average expected utility in the most populated ZCTA in the market (the EUrepjm variable de￿ned
for the logit model) and the average income across the other markets in which the plan is observed to
be active. It is clear that EUrepjm should be correlated with premiums and the setup of the model
already implies that it is uncorrelated with unobserved quality ￿ as required for a valid instrument.
Some additional assumptions are needed to include the average income across the rest of the plan￿ s
markets as an instrument. First, the average income in each market must a⁄ect aspects of the plan￿ s
unobserved quality, such as promotional activity, in that market but not in others, and this activity
must a⁄ect plan costs. Second, plans must set premiums in market j taking account of costs in other
markets. Put simply, the assumption is that plans determine variables such as promotional activity
locally but set premiums (at least partly) centrally52.
Standard error adjustments are again needed to account for the variance introduced in the ￿rst two
steps of estimation; the methodology used is exactly analogous to that described for the logit model.
6 Demand Results
6.1 Hospital Demand: Results
Tables 6 and 7 set out the results of the hospital demand speci￿cation. Table 6 shows the results of
the ￿rst stage: the estimation of the hospital choice model using MLE and including hospital ￿xed
e⁄ects. The results are very much in line with the previous hospital choice literature, and are intuitive.
If a hospital moves an additional mile away from a patient￿ s home, this reduces the probability that
the patient will choose it by 21%. Emergency admissions are even more sensitive to distance than
non-emergencies53. The non-interacted e⁄ect of teaching hospitals on patient utility is subsumed
51I use heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors which also allow for correlated errors across the three stages of
estimation. The weight matrix used in this analysis is the two stage least squares weight.
52The assumptions needed are somewhat troubling. However, the instrument does seem to be valid: the estimated
coe¢ cients change very little, and the standard errors go down, when the instrument is added. The Di⁄erence-in-Sargan
or C-statistic for this instrument (Hayashi p218) was 1.37, implying that the null that income is a valid orthogonal
instrument cannot be rejected even in a test of size 0.24.
53The average distance from an individual to a same-market hospital in the data is 22.8 miles. The average distance to
the chosen hospital is 12.4 miles. This distance increases to 12.9 miles when we consider only emergency cases. This may
23in the ￿xed e⁄ects; however, the interaction coe¢ cients show that patients with the most complex
conditions (neurological diagnoses) attach the highest positive weight to these types of hospital. Cancer
patients have very strong preferences for hospitals with a large number of nurses per bed. Women
in labor are the only types of patient attaching a positive weight to for-pro￿t hospitals. Finally, and
reassuringly, cardiac diagnoses place a strong positive weight on hospitals with good cardiac services;
cancer patients on hospitals with good cancer services (although this coe¢ cient is not signi￿cant at p
=0.1), and women in labor and newborn babies have a strong preference for hospitals with good labor
services.
The interaction terms between PPO dummies and hospital characteristics are almost all insignif-
icant. This provides support for the assumption that indemnity and PPO enrollees have identical
preferences over hospitals conditional on demographics and diagnosis. Most of the interactions be-
tween patient income and hospital characteristics are either positive or insigni￿cant. This probably
implies that higher-income individuals have a stronger preference for high-tech hospitals and more
personalized care, rather than that they are willing to pay more for their services, although the latter
may also be relevant for PPO enrollees choosing out-of-network hospitals. The ￿t of the overall model
is reasonable given that only a cross-section of data is used: the pseudo-R2 is 0.4354.
The results of the regression of the predicted hospital dummy coe¢ cients on hospital characteristics
are shown in Table 7. Many of the hospital characteristics included (particularly the hospital service
variables, each of which was set to 1 if the hospital o⁄ered the relevant service, and 0 if not) are
correlated with each other, making the individual results di¢ cult to interpret. However, it is clear
from the results that consumers place a positive value on the number of nurses per bed, the number
of doctors per bed, and overall on hospital accreditation. Hospitals at a higher distance from the city
center are more popular with patients, probably because distance from the patient￿ s home is negatively
correlated, on average, with distance from the city. The ￿t of this model is similar to the ￿rst stage:
the R2 is 0.4455.
imply that some emergencies in the data are in fact non-urgent cases admitted through the emergency room. However,
it may simply be that urgent cases are admitted to the closest hospital that o⁄ers the necessary services rather than
the closest hospital overall. In either case, it is reassuring that the hospital demand results are robust to including or
excluding emergency admissions.
54The pseudo-R
2 is de￿ned as 1 - (L1/L0), where L0 is the constant-only log likelihood and L1 is the full model
log-likelihood. The model chi-squared(261) = 74,810, with p-value=0.0000.
55As already noted, almost 100% of the variance here is due to the sampling error in ￿ (￿), rather than to unobserved
hospital quality ￿.
246.2 Plan Demand: Results
Table 8 sets out the results of the logit demand speci￿cation under the assumption that ￿ = 0. Results
are reported for three speci￿cations. Speci￿cation 1 has no ￿xed e⁄ects. Speci￿cation 2 includes large
insurer ￿xed e⁄ects which measure consumer preferences for speci￿c national plans. Speci￿cation 3
includes both large insurer and market ￿xed e⁄ects; the latter control for unobserved di⁄erences in
the outside option across markets. Including large insurer ￿xed e⁄ects improves the ￿t of the model;
adding market ￿xed e⁄ects improves it still further (the R2 increases from 0.36 to 0.59 to 0.67 when
both types of ￿xed e⁄ect are included).
The coe¢ cient on premium is negative but not signi￿cant in any of the speci￿cations; its magnitude
suggests an insurer-perspective elasticity of -1.24 and that a $5 increase in premiums per member per
month would reduce the probability that a plan is chosen by 0.001256. These ￿gures are at the low
end of the range found in previous studies. As noted in section 5.3.1, the low ￿gures may be caused
partly by attenuation bias due to noise in the premium measure57.
The key variable, EUrepjm, has a positive coe¢ cient in all three speci￿cations, implying that
consumers care about hospital networks: a plan￿ s market share would be predicted to decrease if it
excluded hospitals. The magnitude of the coe¢ cient increases when market ￿xed e⁄ects are added58;
it is signi￿cant at p=0.05 in Speci￿cation 3. The most straightforward way to interpret the result
is to compare the marginal e⁄ect of EUrepjm to that of plan premiums. The results imply that a
1 standard deviation increase in expected utility from the hospital network is equivalent to a $39
reduction in premium per member per month (a change in premium of a little less than one standard
deviation). So the e⁄ect of the hospital network on plan demand is important but not too large. The
coe¢ cient on the number of physicians per 1000 population is also positive and signi￿cant, implying
that consumers prefer plans with large physician networks. The coe¢ cients on HEDIS and CAHPS
56The insurer-perspective elasticity is based on the full premium rather than the out-of-pocket prices faced by enrollees.
57Examples of the previous literature include Cutler and Reber￿ s (1996) estimate of -2 for the insurer-perspective
elasticity. Royalty and Solomon (1998) estimate insurer-perspective elasticities between -1.02 and -3.5. The elasticity
estimates in Strombom et al (2002) range from -0.8 to -5.2. Buchmueller (2005) estimates an elasticity of -3.3 and that
a $5 premium increase reduces the probability that a plan is chosen by 0.002 to 0.008. If my results are a⁄ected by
attenuation bias this will lead to an overestimate of the loss in consumer surplus from restricted networks. This issue is
discussed further in the section on welfare below.
58The reason for the increase is probably that consumers are more likely to choose the outside option (being uninsured)
in markets where hospitals on average o⁄er higher utility. This e⁄ect will be absorbed into and bias down the coe¢ cient
on EUrepjm unless market ￿xed e⁄ects are included. The ￿xed e⁄ects account for di⁄erences in the outside option across
markets, leaving the expected utility coe¢ cient to measure the e⁄ect of di⁄erences in EUrepjm across plans within each
market. For this reason, Speci￿cation 3 gives the most relevant results to the question being considered and will be used
for the remainder of the paper.
25variables are di¢ cult to interpret because the variables are fairly highly correlated with each other.
However, most of the coe¢ cients that are signi￿cant are positive as expected.
Consumers seem to signi￿cantly prefer HMO to POS plans. At ￿rst sight this is surprising,
particularly since POS plans o⁄er more ￿ exibility to use hospitals outside the network. The reason is
probably twofold. First, premiums set by POS plans are in general higher than their HMO equivalent;
unfortunately the available data in general reports the same premium amount for both HMO and
POS plans in a given organization. Second, there is a selection problem: plans would prefer to attract
HMO enrollees, who have more restricted bene￿ts, rather than more expensive POS enrollees, and
probably take unobserved steps (e.g. through promotions) to do so. This issue is beyond the scope of
this paper; I assume no selection. Both these complicating factors will lead to a negative bias on the
POS dummy coe¢ cient59;60.
Several robustness checks are used to test the stability of the results to changes in assumptions and
in the underlying data. First, the methodology is repeated using just the plans whose enrollment is
reported by AIS at the PMSA level61. Second, I conduct the test of the assumption that unobserved
hospital quality ￿ = 0 described in Section 5.2.2. Finally, the analysis is repeated using the formula in
footnote 33 to deal with the error term ". All three robustness checks yield results that are extremely
similar to those reported.
The results from the full demand speci￿cation are reported in Table 9. Estimates from Speci￿cation
3 (including both large insurer and market ￿xed e⁄ects) are reported; the equivalent estimates from
the logit framework are also reported here for ease of comparison. The two sets of results are very
similar. The estimates imply an insurer-perspective elasticity of -1.18, consistent with the logit results
but again at the low end of the range of previously-published estimates. The coe¢ cient on expected
utility is higher in the full model: this makes sense because the distribution of consumer characteristics
is now being taken into account. The coe¢ cient on premium/income is very small and not signi￿cant:
higher-income consumers seem not to have a di⁄erent price elasticity of demand for health plans from
59If POS plan premiums were $118 (84%) higher than those of HMOs on average, this would explain the entire POS
coe¢ cient without any assumption regarding selection. Recent industry publications suggest a premium di⁄erence of
around 30% (see for example, the Ohio Chamber of Commerce Task Force Report on Provider Access 2000), implying
that the selection e⁄ect may also be important.
60The estimated coe¢ cients for the missing variable dummies, and for the insurer and market ￿xed e⁄ects in the
relevant speci￿cations, are not reported here. All but one of the missing variable dummies have insigni￿cant coe¢ cients
in Speci￿cation 3. All the insurer ￿xed e⁄ects have negative coe¢ cients, many of which are signi￿cant. Since insurer
￿xed e⁄ects are included only for the largest plans, the implication is that, all else equal, consumers prefer to enrol in
local plans rather than those that operate at a national level.
61See Appendix A for details on this issue.
26their lower-income neighbours. Finally, some of the standard errors from the full speci￿cation are
higher than those in the logit model, implying that too much may be being asked of the limited data
available. Since the magnitudes of the coe¢ cients are so similar, however, I take the full demand
estimation results to be reasonable and use them in what follows.
7 Welfare Implications of Selective Contracting
The demand estimates provide information on the tradeo⁄s consumers are willing to make when
choosing health plans: that is, on the extent to which hospital choice a⁄ects consumers￿welfare and
choice of plans compared to other plan characteristics such as premium, size of the physician network
and clinical quality. The results indicate that consumers signi￿cantly prefer plans that o⁄er larger
hospital networks. The next step is to quantify the welfare bene￿ts attached to an increase in network
size. I consider the impact of a move, holding prices ￿xed, from the observed set of networks in each
market to a hypothesized equilibrium in which every plan o⁄ers every hospital62. The two dimensions
of welfare are considered in turn: ￿rst consumer surplus and then provider and insurer pro￿ts.
7.1 A Simple Measure of Consumer Surplus
The methodology used in this section follows that discussed by Nevo (2001(b)) and based on McFadden
(1981). Consumer i￿ s expected gain from a change in a plan￿ s hospital network, assuming that no other
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62There is only one market in my sample in which all plans already o⁄er an unrestricted choice of hospitals: this is
Bu⁄alo NY. This market will therefore exhibit a zero welfare increase from the network change being considered.
27Note that this is the expected welfare gain from the perspective of the econometrician given the
available data. A dollar-valued measure of welfare can be obtained using the method suggested by
Hicks (1939) to create the equivalent variation (EV). The EV is the change in consumer wealth that








where ￿i is the negative of the coe¢ cient on premium in the plan utility equation. Integrating



















where ni is the population in ZCTA-age-sex cell i and the di⁄erence between V t
ijm and V t￿1
ijm comes
solely from the change in the hospital network o⁄ered by each plan63. The expression for EUt￿1
ijm is
calculated using the speci￿cation in equation (12) and considering a network that includes all hospitals
in the market. EUt
ijm takes the value already calculated using equation (12) and the observed networks.
I also adjust for hospital capacity constraints. When a hospital is predicted to be over 85% of its
maximum capacity I reallocate patients randomly to non-capacity constrained hospitals in the market.
The adjustment a⁄ects patients￿hospital choices and therefore their values of EUijm; these values are
used to adjust down each patient￿ s utility from each plan64.
The results of this exercise are presented in Figure 3. Column 1 of the Table and Graph 1 give
details on the EV per privately insured person per year: the dollar spending needed to compensate the
average consumer in the market for a move back from unselective to observed networks. The variation
in this measure across markets is high: from -$29 in Las Vegas NV to a very high $722 per person
year in Austin TX. The median value is $15.70 per person per year. Aggregating over consumers, this
63The utility o⁄ered by the ouside option (being uninsured) is treated the same as that from any other choice: having
normalized Vi0m to zero for each market, we include a term e
0 = 1 in each log sum expression.
64The adjustment does not a⁄ect patients￿choices of plan; I assume that consumers expect to have access to every
hospital on the plan￿ s list when they make their plan choice. Instead I account for the fact that some patients ￿nd, when
they get sick, that they cannot access their preferred hospital and therefore receive less utility than expected from their
chosen plan. The median equivalent variation falls only slightly as a result of this adjustment.
28implies a total EV of $1.04 billion per year for the 43 major markets in the data65;66.
Two caveats should be mentioned here. First, the imprecise estimate of the premium coe¢ cient
implies some uncertainty about the welfare estimates. The noisy measure of premiums may also
lead to attenuation bias and an over-estimate of the consumer surplus loss from restricted networks.
I investigate the impact of these issues by recalculating the welfare estimates setting the premium
coe¢ cient at di⁄erent levels. Increasing the elasticity to -3, a value more consistent with the previous
literature, reduces the predicted consumer surplus loss to just $0.27 billion (or $4.03 per person).
Smaller elasticities are required to make the welfare e⁄ects larger: for example, an elasticity of just
-0.5 (improbably low compared to previous estimates) is needed to generate a consumer surplus loss
of $2.59 billion or $39.10 per person per year67. The second caveat, as noted in the Introduction, is
that this analysis simply considers the loss to consumers from restricted hospital choice, ignoring the
bene￿ts (from reduced hospital costs and margins) that these restrictions bring with them68.
7.2 Welfare Analysis: Producer Surplus
I do not attempt to distinguish between hospital and plan pro￿ts in the producer surplus calculation
since this would require estimating the prices paid to hospitals and therefore a full model of the
supply side. Instead I consider the e⁄ect of the network change on the sum of hospital and plan pro￿ts
(that is, on total producer surplus). The producer surplus generated by a given network depends on
the number of consumers attracted to each plan and the cost of the hospitals they visit. I use the
65Median values are used to reduce the impact of outliers. The negative value in Las Vegas NV is caused because
the move to unselective contracts displaces some high-valuation patients from capacity-constrained hospitals in favour of
patients who value the hospital less. Only three of the 43 markets have negative EV per person values. Graph 1 of Figure
2 makes clear that Austin TX, which has an EV per person of $722 per year, is an extreme outlier. It includes a plan
that is signi￿cantly di⁄erent from others in the data. Scott and White Health Plan is managed by physicians, has strong
links with the community, and is heavily focused on preventive rather than acute care. The demand model￿ s ability to
identify the e⁄ect of this plan￿ s characteristics on consumer utility is limited: the speci￿cation implies that all attributes
other than premiums and the hospital network a⁄ect all consumers equally, whereas Scott and White plan￿ s strengths
are likely to appeal to some consumers more than others. The predicted average quality of the plan, and therefore the
estimated welfare e⁄ects for this market, are therefore likely to be biased. However, this is an issue that probably only
a⁄ects a few markets (Austin TX is clearly an extreme case), so reporting median results should be su¢ cient to control
for the problem.
66I repeated the analysis holding Kaiser plan networks ￿xed and not allowing other plans to agree on contracts with
Kaiser hospitals. In this case the total EV fell to $0.16 billion per year.
67I would ideally have used a Monte Carlo analysis to calculate standard errors for the welfare estimates. Unfortunately
the scale of this computation was infeasible: the demand analysis takes approximately 10 hours to run so the simulation
would have taken 42 days if 100 draws were taken from the parameter distribution.
68In many cases a premium increase simply represents a transfer from consumers to ￿rms: this should therefore not
have a signi￿cant e⁄ect on the calculation of total social welfare. However, there would be welfare e⁄ects in cases where
the change prompted consumers to choose to be uninsured. Large premium increases could lead to large increases in the
uninsured population.
29demand estimates to predict consumer ￿ ows to both plans and hospitals before and after the network
change. These are used to calculate revenues (which are increasing in the number of consumers that
choose high-premium plans) and costs (which increase if consumers on average choose more expensive





ni sijm(premjm ￿ costi) (29)
where ni is again the population in ZCTA-age-sex cell i, sijm is plan j￿ s share of type-i people in
market m as speci￿ed in equation (23), and costi is the cost of treating a person of type i69. As before,
de￿ne pil as the probability that consumer-type i is admitted to hospital for diagnosis l. If sihl is
the probability that a type-i person with diagnosis l will visit hospital h (the term in parentheses in
equation (8)) and costhl is the cost that hospital h incurs by treating a patient with diagnosis l, then











The change in producer surplus when the plan switches to o⁄ering a free choice of hospitals, which







jm is the producer surplus predicted under the observed contracts and PSchoice
jm is that
predicted when all plans in the market contract with all hospitals. The total change in producer
surplus in the market is the sum of PS
change
jm over all plans j in market m. As in the consumer surplus
calculation I take account of hospital capacity constraints by reallocating patients randomly from
hospitals that are predicted to be over 85% of maximum capacity to other providers in the market.
This reallocation a⁄ects the calculation of treatment costs.
A number of assumptions are made to simplify the analysis. First, I assume that plans have
no variable costs except the payments made to hospitals. Any other variable costs would a⁄ect the
69I assume that plans do not know consumers￿idiosyncratic error terms, " and !, when they make their network
decisions. They therefore predict consumer ￿ ows using share equations (7) and (13), which imply taking an expectation
over the error terms.
30surplus change calculation, even if they were constant across plans, because adding a new hospital could
persuade consumers to switch from the outside option (being uninsured) to being insured, creating
new variable costs that are not captured by the analysis. However, I do not have access to data
on plan variable costs and therefore cannot measure these e⁄ects70. Data on total hospital expenses
per admission are taken from the AHA 2001. Diagnosis-speci￿c cost data would be preferable (since
patient ￿ ows are predicted for each diagnosis separately) but were not available for this study. Finally,
as in the consumer surplus calculations, I assume that plan premiums are ￿xed.
The results of the analysis are set out in Figure 3. The hypothesized network expansion causes a
median reduction in producer surplus of just $0.02 million per market per year. As with consumer
surplus, there is considerable variation across markets, from an increase of $288 million per year to a
decrease of $167 million per year. The median ￿gure implies a total reduction in producer surplus of
$0.80 million per year across the 43 markets in the sample71.
8 Discussion and Conclusion
This paper investigates the welfare e⁄ects of health plan restrictions on hospital choice. I use a three-
stage method to estimate demand for health plans conditional on the hospital networks they o⁄er.
The results indicate that consumers place a positive and signi￿cant weight on their expected utility
from hospital networks when choosing their plans. I ￿nd signi￿cant welfare e⁄ects of a move, at ￿xed
prices, from plans￿observed networks to a hypothesized equilibrium where every plan o⁄ers access to
every hospital in its market. The predicted results are shown in the following table.
Welfare E⁄ect Predicted Change per year from
Move to Unselective Networks
Consumer Surplus $1.04 billion
Producer Surplus - $0.80 million
Total $1.04 billion
70The analysis does allow for the existence of additional ￿xed costs, since these would cancel out when we consider the
surplus change from a change in networks.
71Repeating the analysis holding Kaiser plan and hospital networks ￿xed generated a reduction in producer surplus of
$0.21 million per year. I also conducted the test of sensitivity to changes in the premium coe¢ cient that I used for the
consumer surplus estimates. An elasticity of -3 implies that markets with an increase in producer surplus outweigh those
with a decrease: a move to unrestricted networks would increase total producer surplus by $0.95 million. An elasticity of
-0.5 translates to a producer surplus reduction of $3.31 million from the change. Both these numbers are small compared
to the corresponding consumer surplus e⁄ects.
31The predicted gain in consumer surplus outweighs the reduction in producer surplus: overall the
results imply a bene￿t to society of just under $1.04 billion per year.
The assumption of ￿xed prices and premiums implies that the results of the analysis represent just
one part of the full welfare picture. The existing literature provides evidence on the e⁄ect of managed
care on plan costs and therefore on the potential for premium increases after a move back to broad
hospital access. For example, Cutler et al (2000) found that HMOs had 20-40% lower expenditures
on the treatment of heart disease than indemnity plans. Virtually all of the spending di⁄erence came
from lower unit prices rather than treatment or outcome di⁄erences; premium di⁄erentials generally
matched the di⁄erences in reimbursement. Miller and Luft (1997) survey previous studies: a typical
￿nding in this older literature is that HMOs save about 10% of the costs of indemnity insurance.
The typical privately-insured individual spends several hundred dollars annually for inpatient hospital
care72. Thus even the most conservative of these estimates translates to a saving from managed
care that outweighs the $15.70 per person per year welfare loss from restricted access. If selective
contracting truly o⁄ers managed care plans a key lever to control prices, $16 per person may not be
an excessive price to pay73.
A model of the supply side of the market is needed to understand these e⁄ects more fully. The
analysis in Ho (2005) is a ￿rst step towards estimating such a model. Further research would clearly
be useful to add to and con￿rm these results.
72For example, the National Center for Health Statistics reports that the average annual health care expense for pri-
vately insured consumers who had expenses was $2026 in 2000. The Kaiser Family Foundation (www.statehealthfacts.org)
estimates that 36.4% of personal health care expenditures go to hospital care. This implies a hospital cost of approxi-
mately $700 per person per year.
73The imprecise estimate of the premium coe¢ cient implied some uncertainty regarding the precision of the welfare
estimates. However, as discussed in Section 7.2, a very low elasticity of -0.5 would be needed to bring the welfare e⁄ects
up to $39 per person per year, a number that still seems small compared to the potential cost reductions.
32Appendix A: Details on Hospital and Plan Datasets
Hospital Dataset
The MEDSTAT MarketScan Research Database lists the date, the patient￿ s age, sex, zip code and
primary diagnosis (de￿ned using ICD-9-CM codes), the identity of the hospital, and the type of plan
(managed care; indemnity; PPO etc.) for every admission. I include six diagnosis categories in my
analyses: cardiac; cancer; labor; newborn baby; digestive diseases and neurological diseases. The
speci￿c ICD-9-CM codes included in each category are listed in Table 3. These six categories account
for 55% of the full dataset. The seventh diagnosis category, "other diagnoses", comprises all other
diagnoses included in the data. I also identify emergency admissions using the place of service and
the type of service for each admission.
I supplement the MEDSTAT data with data from the American Hospital Association (AHA)
for 1997 and 1998. This contains hospital characteristics, including details of location, ownership,
accreditation, services provided, number of beds and numbers of admissions, for every hospital in the
USA. I de￿ne distance from the patient￿ s home to the hospital using the ￿ve-digit zip codes of each;
distance of the hospital from the city center is de￿ned as distance from the hospital￿ s ￿ve-digit zip
code to that of the City Hall. Four "service" variables are created from the AHA data to summarize
the services o⁄ered by each hospital: these are interacted with consumer characteristics in the hospital
choice model. The summary variables cover cardiac, imaging, cancer and birth services. Each hospital
is rated on a scale from 0 to 1, where 1 implies that the hospital o⁄ers the least common of a list of
relevant services and 0 implies that it o⁄ers none of the services. Details are provided in Table 4.
The set of hospitals operating in each market is de￿ned by the zip codes of consumers considered
to reside in the market and the distance they are likely to be willing to travel to hospital. I consider
patients whose home zip code is within the Primary Metropolitan Statistical Area (PMSA). Previous
papers have considered hospitals within boundaries such as counties or states, those within 30 miles
or 50 miles of the city center, or those hospitals within 30 or 50 miles of the individual patient￿ s home
zip code74. I limit the analysis to manageable proportions, while still including a reasonable sample of
hospitals, by de￿ning the market to include all hospitals within 30 miles of the city center. I include in
the patient choice set every general medical/surgical hospital, other than those owned by the federal
74See, for example, Tay (2003)
33government, in the relevant market area75.
I consider the 11 largest markets in the MEDSTAT data (those with over 1000 observations per
market-year). The markets are located in Massachusetts, Illinois, Arizona, Washington, Florida, and
Michigan States; ￿ve of the eleven markets are in Michigan76. There are a total of 237 hospitals
and 29,657 encounters77 in these market-years. A number of observations are lost from the analysis
because of missing hospital or individual data: if a variable (such as home zip code) is missing for a
given individual, that individual is excluded from the analysis. If a variable (such as services provided
or location) is missing for a given hospital, the missing data is ￿lled in using surrounding years of
AHA data where possible; otherwise that hospital, and all individuals who chose it, are excluded. The
￿nal dataset comprises 217 hospitals, 434 hospital-years and 28,666 encounters in total78.
Plan Networks
The 516 plans for which network data was collected comprise all HMO/POS plans in 43 markets,
as de￿ned by the Atlantic Information Services data discussed in section 4.379. The list of potential
hospitals comprises all general medical/surgical hospitals listed by AHA 2001 that have more than
150 beds, are not owned by the federal government, and are located in the relevant PMSA. In smaller
PMSAs, where there were fewer than 10 such hospitals, facilities with over 100 beds were included80.
The expected utility calculation requires the di⁄erent types of consumers to be de￿ned using
variables observed in the aggregate plan data; I therefore de￿ne types by sex, age group (0-17; 18-34;
75According to this market de￿nition, the Boston market contains 37 hospitals; Chicago contains 72. If I included
every hospital within 50 miles of the city center, Boston would have 72 hospitals and Chicago would have 86.
76The markets are Boston MA, Chicago IL, Dayton-Spring￿eld OH, Orlando FL, Phoenix AZ, Seattle WA, and Detroit,
Grand Rapids, Kalamazoo-Battle Creek, Lansing, and Saginaw-Bay, all in MI.
77Each encounter is an individual admission; 51% of these are for PPO enrollees. If a single patient is admitted more
than once in the two-year time period, I assume that the admissions represent independent choices.
78This attrition will bias the results if it is non-random. The characteristics of consumers whose data is missing are
unlikely to be biased in any direction. While it is possible that smaller hospitals are less likely to report data to AHA,
this seems unlikely because the existence of missing data in one year does not predict whether data in the subsequent or
previous year will be missing.
79I consider all the markets covered by the AIS data except New York. The markets are: Atlanta GA, Austin TX,
Baltimore MD, Boston MA, Bu⁄alo NY, Charlotte NC, Chicago IL, Cincinnati OH, Cleveland OH, Columbus OH,
Dallas TX, Denver CO, Detroit MI, Fort Worth TX, Houston TX, Indianapolis IN, Jacksonville FL, Kansas City MO,
Las Vegas NV, Los Angeles CA, Miami FL, Milwaukee WI, Minneapolis MN, New Orleans LA, Norfolk VA, Oakland
CA, Orange County CA, Orlando FL, Philadelphia PA, Phoenix AZ, Pittsburgh PA, Portland OR, Sacramento CA, St.
Louis MO, Salt Lake City UT, San Antonio TX, San Diego CA, San Francisco CA, San Jose CA, Seattle WA, Tampa
FL, Washington DC, and West Palm Beach FL.
80This simple de￿nition of the hospitals in the market was not used in the hospital dataset because, in some of the
smaller markets included in that data, it seems likely that patients would choose to travel outside the MSA to go to
hospital. The 30-mile radius de￿nition increased the hospital choice set in these markets. The plan dataset covers only
larger MSAs, for which a 30-mile radius would reduce the hospital choice set in almost all cases.
3435-44; 45-54; 55-64) and zip code tabulation area (ZCTA) of residence. There are 10 cells per ZCTA
(5 agegroups and 2 sexes within each), and a total of 6363 ZCTAs across the 43 markets (an average
of 148 in each market). The number of people in each ZCTA-age-sex cell is found using Census 2000
data from GeoLytics81. Diagnosis probabilities given age, sex, and admission to hospital are estimated
from the MEDSTAT data using probit analysis; probabilities of admission to hospital given age and
sex are taken from the National Hospital Discharge Survey 2000.
AHA data for 2001 (the most recent year for which data was available) was used in the expected
utility calculation. A number of hospitals have missing data for AHA 2001. To avoid dropping these
from the choice set, the missing data was ￿lled in using previous years of AHA data where possible,
and if necessary (for 16 hospitals) using information provided in individual hospital websites82.
Two plans in my sample o⁄er none of the hospitals in the de￿ned choice set but are licensed in and
have signi￿cant numbers of enrollees in the market. Each of these o⁄ers a number of smaller hospitals
in the relevant area (too small to be included in the base list of hospitals used to de￿ne plans￿hospital
networks). The expected utility from these plans￿networks cannot be calculated using my dataset. I
assume that a substantially restricted choice set reduces expected utility compared to other plans in
the market; I therefore assign each type of consumer the minimum possible utility from any hospital
in the market, given each diagnosis, if he or she chooses one of these two plans.
Plan Characteristics
The two datasets from Atlantic Information Services are The HMO Enrollment Report and HMO
Directory 2003. Both are based on plan state insurance ￿lings. The enrollment data gives detailed
enrollment for every HMO and POS plan in 40 major markets in the USA83. The characteristic data
cover all commercial health plans in the USA.
81The analysis requires ZCTA-age-sex cells to be de￿ned for an entire MSA. ZCTAs, rather than zip codes, were used
because Census data from 2000 onwards uses the former rather than the latter. Some ZCTAs cross MSA boundaries,
implying that this aggregation to MSA level is not exact. However, the di⁄erence in de￿nitions accounts for a less than
8% di⁄erence between the MSA population de￿ned by the MSA boundary and that de￿ned by the boundaries of its
constituent ZCTAS. Since residents of contiguous ZCTAs are likely to have similar characteristics (income, distance from
hospitals and age/sex distribution), I assume that ZCTA and MSA boundaries are perfectly aligned.
82Data was taken from hospital websites in 2003. The same data was not used to ￿ll in 1997/98 characteristics since
hospitals are likely to have changed the services o⁄ered over the intervening ￿ve year period.
83AIS works with individual plans to disaggregate their base data. The data includes some Medicare-only and Medicaid-
only insurers as well as commercial plans; my analysis excludes the former and examines only plans that accept commercial
business. I also exclude plans with fewer than 100 enrollees and/or no hospitals in the relevant market; I assume that
these plans primarily serve neighbouring areas. AIS publishes the data for 40 markets. I disaggregate this to 43 markets;
see later in this section for methodology.
35The unit of observation for the NCQA data is the NCQA plan identi￿er, which does not correspond
exactly to the identi￿er for the AIS enrollment data. I matched the NCQA and AIS datasets at the
insurer￿ product-market level; in cases where multiple NCQA plans correspond to one AIS plan I used
the mean rating over NCQA plans. Similarly, the Weiss data and AIS characteristic data do not
correspond perfectly to AIS enrollment data plan identi￿ers: both contain more aggregated data (for
example, characteristics are provided for Aetna Florida rather than Aetna Jacksonville; Aetna Miami
etc.) and often covers only HMOs. I matched the two datasets to the AIS enrollment data at the
insurer-product-market level where possible, and at the insurer-market level otherwise. I matched
aggregate data to all plans within the geographic area, and if no POS data was given separately, I
matched the plan￿ s HMO characteristics to both HMO and POS plan types.
Missing data represents a signi￿cant issue. Of the 516 observations considered, 162 (31.4%) do
not have HEDIS data and 212 (41.1%) do not have CAHPS data. Most of the plans without data
did not respond to NCQA data requests; many did not provide information for any of the HEDIS
and CAHPS categories used in this paper. There are similar problems with the price measure used:
premium earned per enrolled member per month. In most cases (354 observations) this measure is
calculated from AIS data on both premium and enrollment. Both inputs come from Weiss for 120
observations (where one or both pieces of information was missing in the AIS data). Price data are
missing for 42 plans (8.2% of observations). Dropping plans with missing data (particularly NCQA
data) could cause selection bias because the plans that failed to respond to NCQA requests are likely
to be smaller or have lower quality than those that provided data. Instead I include these plans and
add dummy variables that indicate missing premium and characteristic data84.
I convert the AIS enrollment data to market share using the total non-elderly population of the
MSA as de￿ned by the Census Bureau in 2000 as the denominator85. The share uninsured and the share
in PPO/indemnity plans in each market are also needed for the analysis. Census Bureau data is used to
￿nd the number of non-elderly uninsured; the di⁄erence between the total non-elderly population and
the sum of uninsured and insured by HMO/POS plans is assumed to be indemnity/PPO coverage. One
assumption is implicit in this methodology. The publicly insured, non-elderly (Medicaid) population
should ideally be excluded explicitly from these groups. When this was done using Census data
84The other alternative would be to ￿ll in the missing observations with previous years￿data. This is not attempted,
both because plans with missing data in 2000 often had missing data in previous years and because cross-year correlations
in reported data for a given plan are low (much lower than for the hospital data where this approach was used).
85I exclude people aged over 64 from the plan demand equation in order to exclude Medicare enrollees.
36some markets had very low or negative implied indemnity/PPO market shares. I therefore ignore the
existence of the non-elderly publicly insured. The problem is caused by errors in the AIS enrollment
data; I assume that the errors are randomly distributed across plans and markets and therefore will
not bias the results.
Plan enrollment in 17 of the 40 markets is reported at the Consolidated Metropolitan Statistical
Area (CMSA) rather than the PMSA level. Most of these86 are essentially one major city surrounded
by very minor or inseparable suburbs: in these cases I perform the analysis as if the CMSA is a PMSA
centered in the major city. However, for ￿ve CMSAs 87 the population was su¢ ciently di⁄use to
warrant considering the individual PMSA/MSAs separately (for example, consumers in Miami would
probably not consider which hospitals were available in Fort Lauderdale when choosing a health plan).
I disaggregate enrollment in these ￿ve CMSAs to PMSA/MSA level using the populations of the
counties where each plan was licensed; plans in the nine largest of these PMSA/MSAs are included in
the plan choice model88.
Atlantic Information Services report enrollment at the level of detail provided by the insurer89.
For 163 out of 516 plans (31.6%), enrollment data is reported at the state or (for three plans) national
level rather than the MSA level. I disaggregate the state or national level data to MSA level, again
using the populations of the counties in which each plan was licensed, and estimate the models using
all 516 observations. I perform a robustness test of the e⁄ect of this approximation by re-estimating
the model using just the 353 plans for which MSA-level data is provided; the missing HMO/POS
plans are pulled into the "indemnity/PPO" option. The results obtained through the two di⁄erent
methodologies are very similar.
I test the ￿nal market share data by comparing the implied total HMO share in each market to
published data on market shares by state. The results are encouraging. For example, the predicted
total HMO share in Boston is 57% of the non-elderly (and by assumption non-Medicaid) population;
published data from the Kaiser Foundation (www.statehealthfacts.org) implies that HMOs have a 53%
share of the non-elderly non-Medicaid population in Massachusetts.
86Examples are Cincinnati-Hamilton, Cleveland-Akron, and Sacramento-Yolo.
87These are Dallas-Fort Worth, Los Angeles-Riverside-Orange County, Miami-Fort Lauderdale and San Francisco-
Oakland-San Jose.
88One market, New York, was included by AIS but excluded from my analysis because the market boundaries were
di¢ cult to de￿ne. 43 markets are therefore considered in total.
89This is an advantage compared to some other vendors￿market share data, in which researchers are not informed
which plans provided data at the MSA level and for which the vendor disaggregated data originally provided at the state
or national level.
37Appendix B: Estimating the Magnitude of ￿
This appendix outlines the methodology used to estimate the variance of unobserved hospital quality
￿. Recall the regression de￿ned by equation (9):
^ ￿h = xh￿ + ￿h + ￿h
where ￿h is the sampling error in ￿h, de￿ned by:
^ ￿h = ￿h + ￿h
Assume that ￿ and ￿ are independent, that ￿ has a Normal distribution with mean zero and E(￿￿0)
= ￿2I, and that:
E(￿i￿j) = !2
i if i = j
!ij otherwise
The assumptions imply that the error variance for the regression analysis, de￿ned as uh = ￿h + ￿h,
will not be homoscedastic. Following Hanushek (1974) and Lewis (2000), begin by running an OLS
regression of ^ ￿ on x and de￿ning ^ u as the residual vector. The expectation of the sum of squared





h) = E(u0u) ￿ tr((X0X)￿1X0￿X)
where ￿ is the variance-covariance matrix of the vector of regression residuals u and tr is the trace















where H is the number of observations in the sample, k is the number of variables in X, and G = ￿￿￿2I
is the variance-covariance matrix of ^ ￿ in the ￿rst-stage hospital choice model. (
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h !2
h is the trace of


















h is the sum of squared residuals from the OLS regression of ^ ￿ on x.
I follow this methodology and ￿nd that ^ ￿2 < 0. As noted by Lewis, this result is possible in small
samples and can be assumed to imply that ￿2 = 0.
90The trace of a square matrix is the sum of its diagonal elements.
38Appendix C: Adjusted Standard Error Estimates
This appendix provides further details on the method used to adjust the standard errors for the
three-step demand estimation process. Pakes (1997) proves consistency and asymptotic normality of
two-step GMM estimators. The methodology used in this paper is an extension to the three-step
case. The necessary proofs are straightforward and are not given here; the following instead provides
a derivation of the functional forms used in estimation. Consider the three steps of the estimation:
1. In Step 1 the following equation is considered:
uihl = ￿h + xh￿il￿ + "ihl
























2. In Step 2, a consistent estimate ￿n of the true ￿ in the following equation is found using OLS:
^ ￿h = xh￿ + uh



















where, analogous to Step 1:
M(￿) = Em(x;￿)
3. Finally, consider Step 3. Considering the logit equation, and assuming a unit weight matrix
for simplicity, we use two-stage least squares to ￿nd a consistent estimate, #n, of the true parameter
vector # in the following equation:
yjm = log(sjm) ￿ log(som) = zjm# + !jm
39where:
z1jm = EUrepjm = h(z;x;￿;￿n;￿n)












where Wjm is a vector of instruments. De￿ning ￿3 and L3 analogously to the de￿nitions in Steps 1
and 2 above, it can be shown that:
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nM1(￿n ￿ ￿) +
p
nM2(￿n ￿ ￿)]
The fact that ￿n and ￿n are GMM estimators implies that:






and similarly for (￿n ￿ ￿). This results in the following formula for V:



























































where vc1 and vc2 are the variance-covariance matrices for the ￿rst and second steps respectively.
The ￿rst three terms in this expression represent the impact of the variance-covariance matrices from
each of the three steps on the ￿nal standard errors; those for the ￿rst two steps are increasing in the
derivative of the third-step moment with respect to the ￿rst and second-step estimators respectively.
The last six terms measure covariance e⁄ects, allowing for correlated errors across the three steps of
estimation. The required standard errors are estimated by replacing expectations with sample averages
in the above expression.
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42Figure 1: Variation in Plan Networks Across and Within Markets
This ￿gure summarizes the variation in selectivity of plans￿hospital networks both across and within
markets. Markets are categorized on a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 is the least selective. Markets are
fairly evenly distributed across the categories as shown in the following table.
Category De￿nition Number Examples
of markets
1 The 5 largest plans (by enrollment) contract with
all 8 largest hospitals (by number of admissions)
6 Baltimore MD;
Atlanta GA
2 One plan excludes at least one hospital 10 Boston MA;
Columbus OH
3 Two plans exclude at least one hospital or three
plans exclude exactly one hospital each
6 Detroit MI; San
Francisco CA
4 Three plans exclude at least one hospital; one of
them excludes more than one
13 Houston TX;
Miami FL
5 Four or more plans exclude at least one hospital each 8 Portland OR;
New Orleans LA
























Graph 2: Number of major hospitals excluded by each plan in selective markets
(dark bars; categories 4-5 in the table above) compared to unselective markets

























43Figure 2: Overview of the Three-Stage Estimation Process
This table summarizes the three steps of the estimation process. The key input to the plan demand
equation is the expected utility variable which measures the utility each type of consumer could expect
to receive from each plan￿ s hospital network given his age, gender and location. It is calculated using
parameter estimates from a separate analysis (the hospital choice model) that uses a di⁄erent dataset
(MEDSTAT data). This linking of datasets is necessary because no single source simultaneously
identi￿es the patient￿ s insurer and corresponding hospital choice set, the chosen hospital and the
patient￿ s characteristics.
Step of Estimation Data Inputs Outputs
1. Hospital demand MEDSTAT: encounter-level data Estimated e⁄ect of hospital
on indemnity and PPO patients￿ characteristics on consumer
characteristics and choice of utility given age, gender,
hospital in 11 markets, 1997-8 diagnosis and location
AHA: hospital characteristics
2. Expected utility New dataset listing network of Expected utility of every
each HMO/POS plan in 43 consumer type in the market
markets, Q1 2003 from every plan￿ s network
of hospitals
Estimated parameters from Step 1
3. Plan demand AIS: market share and Estimated parameters
characteristics of HMO/POS of plan demand equation
plans in 43 markets, 2002
NCQA: clinical quality and
consumer assessment data, 2000
Weiss: characteristics of
HMO/POS plans, 2002
Expected utility from Step 2
44Figure 3: Welfare E⁄ects of Move to Unrestricted Hospital Choice
Equivalent Value per privately Change in Producer Surplus per
insured person ($ per year) market ($ per year)
mean $59.71 - $8.61 million
median $15.70 - $0.02 million
maximum $722.49 $288.2 million
minimum - $28.84 - $166.7 million
std deviation $123.60 $64.6 million
Total gain implied
by median values
$1.04 billion - $0.80 million
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45Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for Hospitals, MEDSTAT dataset
Mean Standard Deviation
Number of beds 286 193
Teaching status 0.20 0.40
For-pro￿t 0.06 0.25
Registered nurses per bed 1.24 0.46
Cardiac services 0.72 0.37
Imaging services 0.42 0.26
Cancer services 0.60 0.41
Birth services 0.82 0.38
Notes: N = 434 hospital - years. Cardiac, imaging, cancer and birth services refer to four summary variables
de￿ned in Appendix A. Each hospital is rated on a scale from 0 to 1, where 0 indicates that no procedures in
this category are provided by the hospital and a higher rating indicates that a less common service is provided.
Table 2: Patient Descriptive Statistics, MEDSTAT Dataset
Mean Standard
Deviation






Distance to chosen hospital (miles) 10.61 9.95
Distance to all hospitals (miles) 20.98 12.93
Female 0.63 0.48





Over 64 0.03 0.17
Industry: Manufacturing (durable) 0.31 0.46
Manufacturing (nondurable) 0.06 0.24
Transport, Communications, Utilities 0.02 0.14
Finance, Insurance, Real Estate 0.01 0.08
Services 0.46 0.50
State and Local Government 0.03 0.17
Working status: Full time 0.74 0.44
Part time 0.002 0.05
Early retiree 0.19 0.39
Retiree 0.04 0.19
PPO enrollee 0.51 0.50
Emergency admission 0.05 0.21
N = 28,666 encounters
46Table 3: De￿nition of Diagnosis Categories
Patient diagnoses were de￿ned by matching the principal diagnosis in the MEDSTAT claims data to 1998 ICD-
9-CM diagnosis codes. The following table lists the codes included in each of the six diagnosis categories used in
the ￿nal analysis. 55% of the total sample is accounted for by these 6 diagnoses; the remainder are distributed
fairly evenly over a large number of other categories.
Category ICD-9-CM codes
Cardiac 393-398; 401-405; 410-417; 420-429
Cancer 140-239
Neurological 320-326; 330-337; 340-359
Digestive 520-579
Labor 644, 647, 648, 650-677, V22-V24, V27
Newborn baby V29-V39
Table 4: De￿nition of Hospital Services
This Table sets out the de￿nition of the hospital service variables used to generate interaction terms for the
hospital demand equation. Hospitals were rated on a scale from 0 to 1 within four service categories, where 0
indicates that no services within this category are provided by the hospital and a higher rating indicates that
less common (assumed to be higher-tech) service in the category is o⁄ered. The categories are cardiac, imaging,
cancer and births. The services included in each category are listed in the following table.
Cardiac Imaging Cancer Births
CC laboratory Ultrasound Oncology services Obstetric care
Cardiac IC CT scans Radiation therapy Birthing room
Angioplasty MRI
Open heart surgery SPECT
PET
The exact methodology for rating hospitals is as follows. If the hospital provides none of the services its
rating = 0. If it provides the least common service its rating = 1. If it o⁄ers some service X but not the least
common service its rating = (1 - x) / (1 - y), where x = the percent of hospitals o⁄ering service X and y = the
percent of hospitals o⁄ering the least common service.
47Table 5: Descriptive Statistics for HMO/POS Plans
Variable De￿nition N Mean Standard
Deviation
Market Share Plan share of non-elderly market 516 0.03 0.04
Enrollment Number of enrollees (thousands) 516 66.22 110.1
Premium pmpm
($)
premiums earned per member per month 478 140.75 44.27
Physicians per
1000 population
number of physician contracts per 1000 popln
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% of members seen as outpatient within 30
days of discharge after hospitalizn for mental
illness
307 0.68 0.15
Care quickly Composite measure of member satisfaction
re: getting care as soon as wanted
304 0.75 0.05
Care needed Composite measure of member satisfaction
re: getting authorizations for needed/desired
care
304 0.72 0.06
Age 0-2 Dummy for plans aged 0 - 2 years 516 0.01 0.08
Age 3-5 Dummy for plans aged 3 - 5 years 516 0.06 0.23
Age 6-9 Dummy for plans aged 6 - 9 years 516 0.17 0.37
Aetna Plan ￿xed e⁄ect 516 0.15 0.36
CIGNA Plan ￿xed e⁄ect 516 0.10 0.31
Kaiser Plan ￿xed e⁄ect 516 0.03 0.16
Blue Cross Blue
Shield
Dummy for ownership by BCBS 516 0.16 0.36
POS plan Dummy for POS plan 516 0.35 0.49
48Table 6: Hospital Demand Results, ML Estimation
Interaction Terms Variable Estimated coe¢ cient
Distance (miles) -0.215** (0.004)
Distance squared 0.001** (0.000)
Emergency * distance -0.008** (0.004)





Newborn baby 0.038 (0.075)
Income ($000) 0.007** (0.001)
PPO enrollee -0.067 (0.050)





Newborn baby 0.071 (0.087)
Income ($000) 0.005** (0.001)
PPO enrollee -0.099* (0.056)





Newborn baby 0.194* (0.122)
Income ($000) -0.001 (0.003)
PPO enrollee -0.036 (0.090)
Interactions: Cardiac Services Cardiac 1.222** (0.134)
Income ($000) 0.001 (0.001)
PPO enrollee 0.080 (0.088)





Newborn baby 0.398** (0.129)
Income ($000) 0.004** (0.001)
PPO enrollee -0.061 (0.072)
Interactions: Cancer Services Cancer 0.073 (0.082)
Income ($000) -0.005** (0.001)
PPO enrollee 0.087 (0.056)
Interactions: Labor Services Labor 3.544** (0.391)
Newborn baby 3.116** (0.487)
Income ($000) -0.003* (0.002)
PPO enrollee 0.045 (0.077)
Hospital ￿xed e⁄ects Yes
Pseudo-Rsquared 0.43
Notes: Maximum likelihood estimation of demand for hospitals using a multinomial logit model. Speci￿ca-
tion includes hospital ￿xed e⁄ects. N = 28,666 encounters. SEs in parentheses; **(*)signif. at p=0.05(0.1)
49Table 7: Results from Regression of Hospital Dummy Coe¢ cients on
Characteristics
Variable Coe¢ cient estimate
Neonatal Intensive Care -1.79 (1.46)
Angioplasty -1.51 (1.61)
Cardiac Catheterization Laboratory 5.90** (1.82)
Computed-tomography scanner 6.53* (3.88)
Positron emission tomography 4.55** (1.57)
Single photon emission computerized tomography -3.23** (1.09)
Oncology services 2.90 (2.08)
Obstetric services -1.93 (1.69)
Emergency Department -4.29* (2.20)
Breast cancer screening/mammograms -4.44* (2.49)
Burn care 2.10 (1.88)
Alcohol/drug abuse inpatient care 0.51 (1.24)
Number of beds 0.01** (0.004)
Distance from City Hall 0.63** (0.19)
Distance from City Hall squared -0.02** (0.01)
Registered nurses per bed 28.18** (4.97)
Nurses per bed squared -9.74** (1.76)
Doctors per bed 3.78** (1.79)
JCAHO accreditation 6.83* (3.45)
Cancer Program approved by ACS 4.32** (1.72)
Residency Training Program -4.46** (1.46)
Medical School 4.72** (1.36)
Member of Council of Teaching Hospitals of the
Association of American Medical Colleges
-0.29 (1.86)
Independent Practice Association - hospital 5.27** (1.15)
Foundation -6.79** (2.04)
Indemnity Fee for Service Plan - hospital 2.56 (2.27)
Primarily osteopathic hospital 1.56 (3.72)
Operates subsidiary corporations 2.24** (1.05)
Controlled/owned by county -9.51** (3.80)
Controlled/owned by Church -4.49** (1.41)
Controlled/owned by For-pro￿t partnership 19.69** (5.06)
Constant -32.10** (5.57)
Market ￿xed e⁄ects Yes
R-squared 0.44
Notes: Regression of estimated hospital ￿xed e⁄ect coe¢ cients from multinomial logit model on hospital
characteristics. N = 434 hospital-years. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses; ** signi￿cant at
p=0.05; * signi￿cant at p=0.1
50Table 8: Plan Demand Results, Logit Speci￿cation
No Fixed E⁄ects Large Plan Large Plan
Fixed E⁄ects and Market
Fixed E⁄ects
Premium ($00 pmpm) -1.26 (3.15) -1.09 (1.67) -0.92 (1.10)
Expected utility from hospital network (EUrepjm) 0.14 (0.14) 0.22* (0.11) 0.55** (0.14)
Physicians per 1000 population 0.30** (0.13) 0.23** (0.08) 0.21** (0.07)
Breast cancer screening 4.77 (4.66) -1.71 (3.21) -0.36 (2.48)
Cervical cancer screening 4.66** (1.83) 4.19** (1.69) 4.46** (1.75)
Check-ups after delivery -0.53 (1.64) 0.26 (1.07) 0.14 (1.03)
Diabetic eye exams 0.39 (1.68) -0.83 (1.19) -1.20 (1.08)
Adolescent immunization 1 -0.77 (1.29) -2.19* (1.08) -4.11** (1.16)
Adolescent immunization 2 -1.74 (1.83) 2.19* (1.47) 3.16** (1.40)
Advice on smoking -7.07** (2.76) 2.75* (1.90) 6.20** (1.80)
Mental illness check-ups -0.34 (2.46) 2.02 (1.79) 2.67** (1.25)
Care quickly 6.64 (6.10) 4.55 (4.47) 0.75 (3.93)
Care needed 3.77 (6.58) -1.85 (4.30) 0.81 (3.60)
Plan age: 0 - 2 years -1.30 (0.98) 0.52 (1.17) 1.33 (0.94)
Plan age: 3 - 5 years -2.31* (1.43) -0.97* (0.53) -0.63 (0.42)
Plan age: 6 - 9 years -1.63* (0.83) -0.26 (0.24) -0.25 (0.22)
POS plan -1.35** (0.22) -1.10** (0.13) -1.11** (0.13)
Constant -9.38 (7.47) -6.75* (3.78) -10.94** (2.89)
Large plan ￿xed e⁄ects No Yes Yes
Market ￿xed e⁄ects No No Yes
R-squared 0.362 0.592 0.671
Notes: Logit estimates of demand for health plans. EUrepjm is as de￿ned in section 5.3.1. Large plan
￿xed e⁄ects are included for insurers active in at least 10 of the markets considered. N=559 insurers (516
HMO/POS plans and 1 indemnity/PPO option for each of the 43 markets). Standard errors (adjusted for
the three-stage estimation process as described in Section 5.3.1) are reported in parentheses. ** signi￿cant at
p=0.05; * signi￿cant at p=0.1.
51Table 9: Plan Demand Results, Logit and Full Speci￿cations
Logit Speci￿cation Full Demand
Speci￿cation
Premium ($00 pmpm) -0.92 (1.10) -0.94 (1.13)
Expected utility from hospital network (EUrepjm or EUijm) 0.55** (0.14) 0.59** (0.21)
Premium ($00 pmpm) / Income ($000 per year) - 0.002 (43.9)
Physicians per 1000 population 0.21** (0.07) 0.21** (0.09)
Breast cancer screening -0.36 (2.48) -0.38 (2.66)
Cervical cancer screening 4.46** (1.75) 4.40** (2.09)
Check-ups after delivery 0.14 (1.03) 0.18 (1.38)
Diabetic eye exams -1.20 (1.08) -1.19 (1.60)
Adolescent immunization 1 -4.11** (1.16) -4.11** (1.17)
Adolescent immunization 2 3.16** (1.40) 3.08 (3.76)
Advice on smoking 6.20** (1.80) 6.17** (2.08)
Mental illness check-ups 2.67** (1.25) 2.70** (1.30)
Care quickly 0.75 (3.93) 0.78 (5.63)
Care needed 0.81 (3.60) 0.85 (3.99)
Plan age: 0 - 2 years 1.33 (0.94) 1.36 (0.97)
Plan age: 3 - 5 years -0.63 (0.42) -0.64 (1.97)
Plan age: 6 - 9 years -0.25 (0.22) -0.25 (0.58)
POS plan -1.11** (0.13) -1.11** (0.13)
Constant -10.94** (2.89) -10.50* (5.65)
Large plan ￿xed e⁄ects Yes Yes
Market ￿xed e⁄ects Yes Yes
Notes: Logit and full (BLP) estimates of demand for health plans. EUrepjm and EUijm are as de￿ned in
Section 5.3. Large plan ￿xed e⁄ects are included for insurers active in at least 10 of the markets considered.
N=559 insurers (516 HMO/POS plans and 1 indemnity/PPO option for each of the 43 markets). Standard
errors (adjusted for the three-stage estimation process as described in section 5.3) are reported in parentheses.
** signi￿cant at p=0.05; * signi￿cant at p=0.1.
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